

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

Y 4. SE 1: 103-2-12

Implementation of the Helsinki Acco...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

BOSNIA'S SECOND WINTER UNDER SIEGE

FEBRUARY 8, 1994

Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE 103-2-12]



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CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Lionel A. Rosenblatt, President, Refugees International	Page 6 9 12
APPENDIX	
Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, opening statement Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman, opening statement Hon. Edward J. Markey, Commissioner, opening statement Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Commissioner, opening statement Lionel A. Rosenblatt, President, Refugees International, prepared statement Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, prepared state-	33 34 36 37 39
ment	46 52



BOSNIA'S SECOND WINTER UNDER SIEGE

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1994

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Washington, DC.

The Commission met in room 485 of the Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, and Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman, Commissioners Frank McCloskey, Benjamin Cardin, and Christopher H. Smith.

Chairman DECONCINI. The Commission on Security and Co-

operation in Europe will come together.

I would like to welcome everybody to this latest Commission hearing on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and, more specifically, on the aggression and genocide which continues unabated.

As we have seen from Saturday's massive attack by Serb gunners on the Sarajevo market, the first two months of 1994 have been among the worst for the residents of that former Olympic city in what is now almost 2 years of war.

While it is not normal to proceedings such as these, I find it appropriate and therefore ask we take a moment of silence for those

who perished in last Saturday's tragedy.

[Pause.]

Thank you.

After two years of genocide and starvation and despite the best efforts at appearement by Western Europe and the United States, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina won't go away. It won't go away because, despite overwhelming odds, the victims have refused to surrender to the forces of genocide and territorial aggression.

Given the fact that the West has severely crippled their struggle by refusing to lift the arms embargo which prevents them from obtaining even defensive weapons, the Bosnian government's valiant

efforts are even more incredible today.

One year ago tomorrow, the Clinton Administration gave us hope that resolute action would be taken to aid the Bosnian Government. But the Administration has chosen instead to hide behind Europeans opposing anything more than providing humanitarian aid to soothe their public's conscience, and negotiating with the aggressor responsible for orchestrating war crimes. We have seen a cowardly refusal to call this genocide. During this period, we have seen blame wrongly placed on Germany or other countries for provoking a war from outside. We have seen explanations of why a "siege" is not a "strangulation." We've seen statements that increasingly and wrongfully allege that all three sides were somehow responsible for the war and that nothing could or should be done

to stop them from killing each other. To quote President Clinton last month: "I don't think that the international community has the capacity to stop people within that nation from their civil war until they decide to do it They're going to have to make up their

own minds to quit killing each other.'

The U.S. policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina fails to understand the need for, and abilities of, U.S. leadership in the world. It fails to note long-term U.S. interests in Europe which this conflict inevitably will affect directly and indirectly. I was pleased yesterday to see the President take a strong position in support of use of force and to instruct his NATO representative to support it. I just hope that he will use every effort he can to see that this takes place. It fails to define objectives in a reasonable way that would allow the most effective and limited actions—air strikes and, potentially, a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina to be forcefully advocated, adopted and implemented. It has failed to build a consensus for action based on the warranted moral outrage over what is being done to innocent human beings. U.S. policy to date, as part of the international community's response as a whole, has failed, and the only question is the extent to which this outcome is by accident or design.

Over the weekend, Lord Owen said the Bosnians have a way out of the continued genocide against them; they can simply accept a negotiated settlement, which rewards the Serb's aggression and relegates the Bosnians to the patchwork of isolated areas which comprise an absolutely inviable state over the long term. In 1992, Secretary of State Christopher said that "the world's response to the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War era." Apparently, the leaders of the world's most powerful nations, including the world's only superpower, the United States, have decided that not only will territorial

aggression rule the day, genocide will indeed be forgotten.

Turning to Croatia, it, too, was a victim of the war but is now siding with the aggressors in the hope of realizing its own land grab. Many are calling for sanctions on Croatia. Croatia deserves sanctions, but I hope that Croatia will reconsider its aggressive actions. This must not sidetrack us from the central cause of this horrendous conflict, the Serb militants—those who deliberately target hospitals, schools, humanitarian aid lines, and busy marketplaces.

With this said, the bottom line is that we need to act on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a comprehensive way that looks at

who is doing what and why.

Let me welcome our two expert witnesses who will speak in greater detail about the situation on the ground in Bosnia. First, we have Lionel Rosenblatt, President of Refugees International, a Washington-based organization which monitors and responds to refugee crises around the world. Refugees International regularly provides updates on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina through its newsletter, Bosnia Winter Watch. Before joining Refugees International, Mr. Rosenblatt was a foreign service officer active in refugee affairs. He has travelled to Bosnia-Herzegovina many times in the past year, I believe 12, and most recently in late January.

I would also like to welcome Mr. Kemal Kurspahic, the editor of the Sarajevo daily newspaper who we've had an opportunity to meet before and be briefed in smaller sessions. The newspaper. which maintains a multi-ethnic staff, has continued to publish despite the siege of the city, the frequent absence of electricity and telephone lines, a shortage of paper, and the destruction of the newspaper headquarters. Five journalists from the newspaper have been killed during the war and he himself was wounded by a sniper bullet. The newspaper has received international awards for its continued effort to bring news to the besieged people of Sarajevo.

I'd also like to welcome the Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr., for agreeing to participate on the panel on a very short notice. Mr. Sullivan is a Washington-based consultant on national security policy matters. He has spent twelve years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where he served six years as Deputy and one year as the principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Since leaving the Pentagon, Mr. Sullivan consults with many defense-related organizations. He will provide us with expert testimony on the availability and feasibility of strategic air strikes.

I regret that I'm going to have to leave for a series of seven votes in about seven minutes. I thank the Panel and I'll try to get back for part of the hearings. I want to yield to the co-chairman who has been a leader in this area before this Senator got involved in it, realizing the necessity to do something early through the CSCE in the former Yugoslavia.

Co-Chairman Hover?

Co-Chairman HOYER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and echo the words that you have just enunciated in your statement and thank our three witnesses for being with us. It's critical to know what's happening on the ground. It's critical to know what we can do.

The hearing we are holding today is, unfortunately, a very timely one. One year ago, the Commission initiated a series of hearings on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina during which witness after witness, representative after representative, senator after senator, said, in effect, "enough is enough. This is aggression. This is genocide. This has to be stopped." Today, Sarajevo continues to be pounded by the artillery shells fired by Serb militants entrenched in the surrounding hills. Tuzla Airport, which the international community has said it wants to open, has recently been shelled by Serb militants as well.

There is evidence of starvation, humanitarian aid is not getting in, victim has turned on victim, and, still, the international community stands, watches and wrings its hands. Yes, news reports abound of officials everywhere, London, New York, Washington, scurrying to come up with a response to this latest atrocity.

But why do so many of those genuinely concerned about Bosnia-Herzegovina question whether they will really act this time? The answer is obvious. Warning after warning, threat after threat, has been followed by feckless backtracking rather than decisive action.

But why didn't we take action earlier, such as in August 1992 when revelations of the Serb-run detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina made "never again" ring grimly in our ears? The answer to this question, unlike the previous one, will evade me forever.

Whatever the answer to this is, at least another 100,000 people, probably more, have died since then, of which the victims of the market massacre are only among the most recent. The newspaper cries out on the front page of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the London Times, and other major newspapers of the world "what is happening?" There will be no cry five years from now or ten years from now or 20 years from now if we had only known, if we only had the information of the atrocities occurring, we would have acted. There will be no solace in that excuse.

Sarajevo citizens of many ethnic persuasions, known earlier for their cosmopolitan and genuinely European character, recently have been commenting that they feel they and their surviving family members are only being kept alive by our humanitarian aid, so that they too will eventually be obliterated by the eventual Serb shell. A recent Reuters Report stated that many children in Sarajevo have now developed passive suicidal tendencies, not bothering to protect themselves from gunfire, according to U.N. officials, because like tragically some of our own children in this country, they expect to die soon anyway.

This hearing follows one which was held last October on the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, during which we sought to focus on the coming winter. At that time, we called for action to be taken to prevent a major catastrophe from happening. Now it is happening, and this hearing intends to learn the specifics of the situation and the prospects for the future in light of this dismal

failure of all to act.

The answers to the problems we faced then are the same as those to the problems we face now. It is for this reason that I support, as all of you know, first and foremost, NATO air strikes against Serb positions around Sarajevo and other so-called "safe havens."

Mr. Sullivan, I look forward to your testimony on that issue. We've had some dispute within the military community as to the

effectiveness of such action.

There is no dispute that no action will have the result that we have seen over the past months. From there we can move to lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina which the Chairman and I and others on this Commission have supported for a long period of time, placing sanctions on Croatia or other measures to bring the

conflict to a halt.

I want to make it clear that although I believe that the Serbs and their leaders are most responsible, they are not alone in the commission of atrocities. Atrocities breed atrocities. Violence breeds violence. The international standards for the sanctity of borders, the action of the United Nations in recognizing an independent sovereign, Bosnia- Herzegovina, spoke strongly to our international obligations to insure that borders recognized by the U.N. were not obliterated by force.

I do not accept the argument that this is a solely civil war. My European friends and colleagues maintain that strenuously. I believe it is a reason for inaction, but it is not an accurate reason,

nor an excuse.

The sooner we stop the Serb militants with their heavy weapons and the supply lines from Belgrade, the better the outcome will be

all around. It is already late for such action, but it's not too late

to save lives that continue to be taken daily.

In the longer term, I must add, we must all prosecute those who may be responsible for war crimes, on all sides, among all combatants, but certainly also at the political level on the Serb side, people like Slobodan Milosevic, bent on greater Serbia, learning the lesson that Hitler learned in the early '30's, that you could galvanize your population by creating an enemy to destroy and to blame. This is not without precedent.

In fact, far too often, the Machiavellian principle of focusing hatred and animus on those without the camp have been utilized by tyrants throughout history. Milosevic is but one of the more recent

practitioners of that political formula.

Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic and others who formulated the policy of genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and orchestrated and carried it out, only this way, in terms of prosecutions and convictions and penalties, can there begin what will nevertheless be a difficult process of reconciliation between the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all of the former Yugoslavia, people who are destined to live next door to one another.

Those of us who have had the opportunity to travel to Europe are struck by the centuries old hatreds that continue to inflame the passions in Europe. To visit Serbia and listen to Kosovo and the problems there about what happened 500 or 400 years ago is just one example of what is so prevalent, unfortunately, in this region

I look forward, as Chairman DeConcini has also said, to hearing from the witnesses today regarding the situation on the ground,

and their thoughts on the prospects for Bosnia's future.

I would like to note one fact, however, before concluding my remarks. Ten years ago to the day, the Sarajevo Winter Olympics opened with much fanfare and excitement over the coming athletic competition. The stadium where the Olympic flame then burst brightly onto our television screens is now a cemetery, the resting place of some of the 10,000 Sarajevans killed since the outbreak of the fighting in and around the Bosnian capital.

When the Olympic flame, a symbol of continuity, is ignited this Saturday in Lillehammer, its glow will be most certainly dimmed by the harsh reality surrounding the strangulation of Sarajevo and the aggression and genocide waged against the people of Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

I apologize to the witnesses and my colleagues for the length of

that statement and talk is cheap. It's time for action.

Now I'd like to recognize my colleague, a member of the Commis-

sion, Mr. Cardin.

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Senator DeConcini and Congressman Hoyer for convening these meetings so that we can continue to put the spotlight in this country on the atrocities that are occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that section of the world.

I want to associate myself with the statements made by both

Senator DeConcini and Congressman Hoyer.

Steny, I could not help but think of the site of the Olympics 10 years ago as you mentioned Sarajevo. How vividly I remember the children dancing at that particular Olympics, and I wonder today how many of those children have died, killed as a result of the war or how many of those children have been displaced or how many of those children today are living in refugee camps. Today we could not have the Olympics in Sarajevo, we couldn't because the people of Sarajevo aren't there. It's a real tragedy.

The facilities such as the stadium and other venues, were created so that we could bring people from all parts of the world together. Through competition, we could better understand each other and create a more peaceful world. Now these facilities are basically facilities of war, used to either facilitate or deal with the cir-

cumstances of war.

It is time for action. We could rehash the past but people are dying and people are being displaced and more and more atrocities are occurring. It's time for us to develop a plan and then carry it out. Our failure in the past is that we've come up with suggestions,

but we've never carried out a united plan.

So I hope that this hearing will give us the opportunity to learn more about what the current circumstances are in the region, help us develop an action plan that we will then carry out, such as air strikes, lifting the arms embargo, and dealing with a peace process. The plan must not reward aggression. In addition, war crime tribunals must be part of a plan. I look forward to the witnesses' presentations. I particularly urge us, as a nation, to be the leader of the world, to bring an end to the atrocities in the region.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much again to our witnesses. I want to apologize for the length of our statements. In any

event, we're very pleased to have the three of you with us.

Mr. Rosenblatt, I'm going to recognize you first. As the Chairman indicated, Mr. Rosenblatt is the President of Refugees International. We're very pleased to have you with us, sir.

TESTIMONY OF LIONEL A. ROSENBLATT, PRESIDENT, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your hearing today comes at a crucial time in the continuing humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia.

There has been no dearth of media coverage of the suffering there. The risk is that we will inure ourselves to the problem and ignore the profound difference that vigorous U.S. leadership could

make even at this very late stage.

As I was drafting these words three days ago, just back from Sarajevo, the first news of that Saturday market massacre came in over the radio: a shell lands among the market crowds, killing 45 and wounding scores more, many seriously, so the death toll is sure to grow. As of yesterday, the death toll indeed had grown to 68 dead and almost 200 wounded, the worst atrocity inflicted on the people of Sarajevo since the Bosnian Serbs put the city under siege 22 months ago. During this, NATO observation aircraft flew overhead uselessly.

This vile attack underscores several truths which we continue to

need to remind ourselves of:

Sarajevo is under murderous siege. As late as last week, before this occurred when I was out there, a senior U.N. official tried to tell us the city wasn't under siege because relief assistance was getting through. We told them that when people are killed as they are regularly by shelling, the city, is indeed, under siege. This market massacre underscores that fact.

Bombardment of civilians is a war crime as we told this official

and that bombardment must cease.

The means to take out the artillery hammering Sarajevo exist in the NATO air strike force already mobilized. The Security Council has already called for the use of air power to suppress the bombardment of safe havens, which includes Sarajevo. President Clinton has reiterated that air power should be used, if the city is be strangled. There is no if. Let there be no doubt. The city is being strangled before our eyes.

This horrible attack is our last call to action. Two weeks ago in the Bosnian capital six children died on their sleds; several days ago nine people were killed while standing in a food relief line.

Each time, many of us said, enough.

We are not calling for ground troops or strategic bombing, but we're calling for protection of civilians from further attack with air power. Air power surely isn't perfect, but further inaction is no

longer an acceptable option.

President Clinton, understand that if a line is not drawn here, if there is no reply to this murderous shelling attack, the Bosnian Serbs will correctly conclude that they can inflict any imaginable atrocity on the civilians in Bosnia without cost. We may as well hand over Sarajevo to its besiegers.

Whenever air strikes have looked likely, the Serbs have reduced their shelling of the city. When, as occurred last July, Secretary Christopher says there is nothing more that can be done, the shell-

ing intensifies.

The war in Bosnia has come to the point where the chief remedies that we in the humanitarian field can urge are the threat of force to protect the civilians and the delivery of the humanitarian assistance to the needy victims.

Let me briefly outline what it looks like on the ground today:

The scope of the suffering is enormous. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, estimates that of the 4.3 million persons at risk in the former Yugoslavia, 2.7 million, over 60

percent, are civilians in Bosnia.

In the face of this need, the UNHCR is able to deliver less than half the minimum food requirement. In Central Bosnia, which includes Zenica and Tuzla, the most populous region of the country, only about 20 percent of the needs are being met. This is less than 1.5 kilograms of carbohydrate per person and about 300 grams of oil per month for many of the recipients in the midst of a cold winter. You can imagine how people are suffering.

The Serbian and Croatian forces, both sides, are blocking this vitally needed UN relief shipment. The continuing refusal of Croatia to expedite the shipment of humanitarian aid from the Dalmatian coast is another form of acute strangulation for Bosnia. The Serbs, in addition to blocking many lands routes, have refused to agree

to open Tuzla airport and have begun to shell the airfield.

This morning, in a phone call to Sarajevo, we determined that the Serbs have begun to block fuel going into that city. So even as the shelling may subside, due to the pressure that's being mounted and focused, they are blocking fuel from entering with a 95 percent "tax" on fuel. Electricity is down because they haven't allowed the electricity lines to be repaired. This is another form of strangulation that must be stopped.

Some of the most acute shortages are in Maglaj and Tesanj, two areas in Central Bosnia where the UNHCR convoys have been

blocked for more than three months.

In my testimony you will see that starvation there could be imminent and we must open up the routes of supply. The Prime Minister of Bosnia, when we met with him last week, urged that air drops which are already being mounted to these areas, be acceler-

ated, given the acute need.

The Mostar area is also suffering gravely, especially the east bank which is under blockade and bombardment by Croatian forces. The civilian population there is forced to huddle underground in basements, rubble of blown out buildings, not being able to come out, except at night, obviously no heat and very minimum assistance.

There is the recent additional problem of military units from Croatia and Serbia invading Bosnia. Several thousand troops are

now in Bosnia that have come in the last few weeks.

Let me briefly outline the recommendations which you have in

our written testimony:

Protect civilians from continuing bombardment with a credible threat of air strikes, starting with the artillery ringing Sarajevo. The Serbian gunners should be given an ultimatum to withdraw within 48 hours and other areas should be included, including Mostar, where the Croatian forces must end their bombardment.

Recommendation 2: As the international community is not prepared to defend against new attacks on the civilian population with its ground troops, the Bosnians should no longer be barred from the means to defend themselves. The arms embargo should be lift-

ed.

3. Deliver humanitarian assistance by all means necessary: open up land routes in Central Bosnia and the Tuzla airport using air power, if necessary. Open the routes from the Dalmatian coast into Central Bosnia invoking sanctions against Croatia if routes are not immediately opened. This is a vital and important step which we wish to underscore today.

The recommendations above are limited and feasible. They don't require U.N. ground troops. What is missing is the political will of the international community. The U.S. which could galvanize a stronger approach, assiduously continues to look the other way. Top officials continue to wring their hands and to rationalize inac-

tion.

One of the latest twists from the State Department is that action on Bosnia is not worth the risk to the Clinton Presidency. One wonders if Chamberlain got similar advice on the way to Munich. Contrary to the counsel from his advisors, failure to act now will haunt the President for the rest of his term and tarnish his place in history.

I wanted to also, in closing, just salute the people of Sarajevo. In my written testimony, we quote from General Francis

Briquemont, the latest General to leave in abject frustration from his command there and he reminds us the people of Sarajevo still are showing incredible dignity, incredible spirit and a spirit of multi-culturalism even in the face of the latest bombardment, something we need to all recall as was said earlier, ten years ago today, the Olympic flame was lit in Sarajevo. Let's be sure that it's not snuffed out by the Bosnian Serbs as we watch.

President Clinton, sending medical teams to help those wounded three days ago in Sarajevo is an important gesture, but the only adequate way to give meaning to the men, women and children killed in the market in Sarajevo last Saturday is to take action to

defend civilians in Bosnia from further attack.

President Clinton, for their sake, the sake of the dead and for U.S. credibility around the world, take the courage to lead. The U.S. cannot, must not dodge this shell.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Rosenblatt.

Mr. Kurspahic?

TESTIMONY OF KEMAL KURSPAHIC, CHIEF EDITOR. (OSLOBODJENJE), SARAJEVO

Mr. KURSPAHIC. I'm coming from that city which is living and dying under a triple death sentence. One is by Serbian gunners who continue to shell and snipe and kill people, massacre civilians there.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Excuse me, Mr. Kurspahic. We have a lot of people, I suppose, watching and maybe they forgot the introduction. Let me remind them that Mr. Kurspahic is the editor-in-chief of the leading Sarajevo daily, so he speaks both as a citizen and as a reporter of on-going events.

I apologize for not making sure everybody understood where you

were coming from. Mr. Kurspahic, thank you.
Mr. Kurspahic. As I said I feel like coming from a city under a triple-death sentence. One, by those gunners, massacring civilians on a daily basis. Second, by the humanitarian misery that was told here, windowless and heatingless city, a Winter Olympic city, without food, water, electricity and without even some symbolic means to communicate.

There was a request to install some telephone exchange systems in Sarajevo and it's waiting for some paperwork to be done in this country, to communicate for those people under siege. It's one of the most basic humanitarian needs. Those are symbolic things which could be done easily as it could be very easy to cut Serbia and Croatia from telephone communications in the world if they prevent Bosnia to enjoy that privilege for 22 months now.

And the third death sentence is death by international ignorance, by the world telling us that there is no willingness or no leadership to protect the country under aggression and even preventing us to

defend ourselves, by the arms embargo.

I agreed very much with President Clinton saying at that recent NATO summit that they shouldn't use threats of air strikes if they didn't mean it. But if they meant it, they had to do it immediately, the same day. That day, when that statement was issued, Sarajevo was shelled and another nine people were killed.

Then there was another shelling a few days after that when those six children were massacred in a slope while sledding in a

working class neighborhood, Alipasino Polie.

Then there was a third on Friday, the day before this most recent massacre, when nine people were killed waiting for humanitarian aid in Dobrinja neighborhood, the one which was built as Olympic Village ten years ago.

That brings me to some terrible feeling that maybe for international community, if something like that exists, it would be OK if they continue exterminating us by tens. Sixty-eight seems to make some noise. And in the last three days we are again witness-

ing all kinds of excuses not to act.

I can't be polite in matters of death and life in my country and I have to express my feeling that even few recent President Clinton's statements are bringing him closer to that European cynical approach to Bosnia. I wouldn't like the American President to abandon high moral ground to which he personally and this country belong, like in those statements like this might shock them to accept peace settlement and "to stop killing each other." There is no killing "each other" there. There is one-sided terror and genocide. Out of 10,000 killed in my city, 1,600 are children, 80 percent are civilians. So don't let us "fight until we stop killing each other" because by the present level of killing, very soon there won't be Bosnians to protect.

Or the statement, that maybe we should issue another threat that if they continue killing civilians we will act. All "ifs" are spent already. There is no credibility to any renewed threat. The Serbs make a mockery out of that with that NATO statement, the bombing of Tuzla airport and at present there is no "if." There is a terrible terror. There is killing. There is massacring of civilians and

it should have been stopped long ago.

I think that what is offered to Bosnia as European Peace Plan is pure blackmail against that country to accept realities created by force. At present, mass killing and rape, concentration camps and acquisition of territories by force. It's not only wrong because it legalizes crimes committed. It's wrong because it's invitation for new years of ethnic cleansing and violence and invitation to destroy the remaining islands of tolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina because in all territories under Bosnia government control in cities like Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac, there are still people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds living in tolerance and when somebody referred to the conflict in Bosnia as all sides in conflict, that confuses the fact that one of those sides represents a democratically elected government of an internationally recognized state and they still, under the most terrible conditions, act like state.

If you remember that terrible killing, a crime committed against British humanitarian worker in Zenica, the Bosnia government arrested and killed some of those who tried to escape the responsibility for that crime. I didn't hear that anyone was brought to justice for running concentration camps at Manjaca and Omarska or for destroying Mostar's old bridge or running camps in Dretelj and some other Croat-controlled areas. Bosnian government is acting in favor of multi-ethnic state and peace proposals are there to destroy what is left of that because there are tens of thousands, maybe

hundreds of thousands of people who will still suffer if that sort of

solution is imposed on Bosnia.

So I really wouldn't like to see the American President accept the European approach to things, that invitation to press for settlement which would mean legalization of crimes committed.

What could be done at this late stage of aggression? I think very

much in just three words: lift, arm and strike? Co-Chairman HOYER. What was the first word?

Mr. KURSPAHIC. Lift embargo, arm Bosnians and strike those who terrorize civilians for two years in Sarajevo, in other U.N. pro-

claimed "safe havens."

The only international instrument, the only resolution which was implemented on Bosnia is the arms embargo, preventing the victims from defending themselves and these days when you have almost unanimous congressional approval for lifting of embargo, remember that 87-9 vote in the Senate just less than two weeks ago, there are academic discussions of a sort that we can't violate international law by unilaterally lifting the embargo.

But international law was violated in implementation of that embargo because any state has the right to self-defense and Bosnia

was prevented from exercising that right.

That arms embargo is even legally non-existent. It was never imposed against Bosnia. It was imposed against former Yugoslavia before Bosnia was recognized and before Bosnia was attacked and there are still all those legal grounds not to lift embargo. I think

it should have been done long ago.

Of course, those three measures lift-arm and strike-should be combined with tightening of sanctions, not lifting of sanctions, until Serbia becomes not only cooperative but enthusiastic about the peace and war crime trials against those responsible for genocide in order to recreate some hope among more than a million and a half expelled, that some day they might come home without endless circle of revenge and violence.

The other thing is that acting is not only morally and even legally imperative, it also has important deterrent effect for spread

of fascism throughout Europe.

If you don't stop Milosevic's fascism, if you allow it to succeed, you will have more Zhirinovsky's around. You could see Zhirinovsky's visit to Serbian controlled areas of Bosnia and Croatia. His promises there that he will create an Orthodox empire from Vladivostok to Krajina in Croatia. Allow that expansionism, ultranationalism to succeed in Bosnia, you will have that all over the place because it has terrible potential to spill over and I believe acting in Bosnia would deter that.

Would air strikes, would lifting of embargo work? What is the next step? I mean, some people would like to scare you not to act,

because there has to be some next step.

I would remind them on the last days of April and the first days of May last year when President Clinton was just talking about taking more decisive steps including military ones, lift and strike. At that time you had Serbs behaving very enthusiastically, Karadzic running to Athens to sign Vance-Owen and Milosevic running to Palec, to beg and encourage self-proclaimed Bosnian Serbs assembly, to accept it and even threatening them with sanctions on

his own and that lasted as along as there was credibility. So I believe that even symbolic air strikes as a message of leadership in this world would work.

And I hope there is high moral standard and there is leadership

in this country. Please act.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Kurspahic. I appreciate it. Mr. Sullivan, we very much appreciate your being here. Mr. Sullivan, as the Chairman says, is the former Assistant Secretary of Defense. He's a designer of military aircraft, an expert on their strategic capabilities. He will discuss the feasibility of conducting against Bosnian-Serb supply lines in Bosnia-Herzegovina and artillery positions around Sarajevo.

Mr. Sullivan is currently a Washington-based consultant for the Systems Planning Corporation, the Analytic Sciences Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis.

Mr. Sullivan, I know you came on relatively short notice and we very much appreciate your presence here because we talk a lot about taking action. There is a dispute, however, on what action can be taken, what action will be effective and you can certainly assist those of us who are very concerned about this issue on that

important question of alternatives that will be effective.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for including me this morning. I often seem to end up doing things on short notice. The price for doing things on short notice is to be misinformed about what is expected of one, so I have prepared a statement for delivery this morning that talks about the philosophy of the post-Cold War World and I did not know I was coming to be an expert on the effectiveness of air strikes, but I do believe-

Co-Chairman HOYER. I apologize for that. Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I don't expect an apology.

Co-Chairman HOYER. I'm very interested in reading your statement on the post-Cold War.

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD SULLIVAN, JR., FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. SULLIVAN. Let me just see if they don't tie together, but let me also distance myself from two people who are personally and intimately and emotionally involved in this particular conflict. I am embarrassed to sit at the same table with people who are so closely involved with something and for which I can only feel disgrace, but I have absolutely no personal involvement myself, so I am in a different kettle of fish and my hat is off to the people who are closer

Co-Chairman HOYER. Send not to know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee and me and all of us.

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the issue-

Co-Chairman HOYER. I understand that, but let me say that I believe that we are part of all that we have met and if the New World Order is to mean anything, this is just my perspective on your comment, I'm not criticizing your comment at all, this is not happening in isolation. I agree with Mr. Kurspahic, it will have ramifications.

My point is this, Mr. Sullivan, that I think that is a general feeling. I think we all need to feel engaged, not only in this instance,

in this tragic part of the world, there are a lot of tragic parts of the world, and quite obviously we cannot act in every one, but I do not either believe that what happens in each of these is something which is not impacting on us long term.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I agree with that one hundred percent and I'm sorry if I misled you on my feelings, but my feelings are theoretical,

rather than personal involvement at this time-

Co-Chairman HOYER. I understand.

Mr. SULLIVAN. —which is what separates me from people who have lost loved ones in recent periods. I agree that we ought to be involved in this and I must say for the first time, I am out of step with our President, when he says we should be very careful not get involved in things that do not affect our vital interests.

In the post-Cold War world, it seems to me, we no longer have two conflicting ideologies. We have an accepted universal standard of behavior and a set of laws that describe in excruciating detail, things that are beyond the pale. And those things beyond the pale

are not necessarily wars, but they are certainly crimes.

Now I think the problem we are having in large measure is because we are asking military folks with whom I've been very close for a long time, to conduct a law enforcement operation, a crime prevention operation, another Vietnam, another police action. And what they find it very difficult to do is to figure out how to apply military power the way all of NATO intended to apply military power for the last 40 years against a set of targets that are not another military organization in the real sense of the word. There is hardly a military organization in the world that doesn't live and fight by a code of ethics. And the aggressors in this situation don't seem to understand any code of ethics at all.

I believe there is a lot to be gained by thinking about this as trying to establish crime control and law enforcement throughout the post-Cold War world and it applies not only in Bosnia but in other

places as well.

The crimes and atrocities are no less serious, but I don't think you can approach them as though they were all caused by a government, that you can fight it and have them surrender and then have peace and then live happily together. I don't think we're involved in that. I think we are involved in the kind of ethnic problems and criminal activities which are going to plague the world for the next 50 years, so when I, in my retirement, try and dream up solutions to this type of problem, I tend to think in terms of longer range, strategic plans for the reestablishment of law and order and I tend to avoid thinking in terms of revenge.

The Israelis love revenge. They have exercised that prerogative for 30 years and I don't think it brought anybody to the peace table

in that part of the world.

One of the best ways to extract revenge, unfortunately, is with air power. It just makes you feel good to go out and bomb something. It's like stamping your foot or pounding the table or hitting the guy that just insulted your wife. The question is does it in the long run change behavior patterns? Does it change the mind of the criminal? What does he do the week after the bombing? I think, unless people think through those problems, they will rush into sit-

uations which do not help the circumstances in that part of the

world over the long run.

Let me say what little I understand about air power. I've been designing airplanes and weapons and I've watched them used. I have designed airplanes that, in fact, have put a lot of Americans in Vietnam POW camps when they didn't work properly. I have recommended bombing targets where the target was missed slightly and did a hell of a lot of damage that I wish hadn't been done.

Air power is a big step toward immaculate warfare. It's an attempt to solve a problem without getting your hands dirty. And I think the dirtiness of the problem we're dealing with here is absolutely extraordinary and I'm a little surprised that none of you mentioned it this morning. You know, there is a separate world of experts and concerned people who worry about the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Well, artillery and rockets and mortars are weapons of mass destruction. It just takes longer to do the damage and as my colleague here has said, the people suffer more while it's going on. Stalingrad, Beirut, Sarajevo, they are all exposed to a continuous pounding against which there is no immediate defense.

But I think the issue is not just arming the Bosnians, the Sarajevans so that they can protect themselves. You've got to disarm the criminals that are using weapons of mass destruction. To suggest that as long as they are 22 miles back or 24 miles back from some target, they're not going to do anybody any harm, is nonsense. They all have wheels and they can all move back where

they were.

I was responsible for developing new technologies in the war in Vietnam and a lot of the high accuracy PGMs, ground sensors, motion detection radars, airborne radars and things like that came out of that war over the next 20 years. One of the things we tried to do there was to kill artillery. And I always remember my disappointment in watching airplanes or hearing about airplanes going out on their daily strikes and they would bomb artillery positions and the following day the recce airplanes would go out to find out what they'd hit, if they hadn't passed their quota of casualties. They would photograph these sites and what they would find was artillery pieces often upside down or on their sides and within three days the artillery would start in again. The North Vietnamese used elephants sometimes to pull the cannons back over again on their wheels so that they could keep firing.

It is very difficult to destroy a piece of solid steel which loves to withstand explosions from within, of enormous pressure and heat. It is easier to go after the ammunition which is softer and it is easier yet to go after the people who are softer. But in the main, you've got to change the minds of the people and make them un-

derstand that this is no longer an acceptable sport.

I would like to point out that I think one of the really tragic things about the introduction of indirect fire weapons into the inventory of terrorists is that it allows all the cowards to play. You know, a really good honest individual atrocity requires that a man walk up to somebody else's child and slit its throat with a penknife. But if you can stand off 20 miles and drink beer and just come out on Saturday afternoons and shoot at a city, the number of people who are willing to partake in that mayhem is enormously larger.

So it is important for several reasons to try and get rid of these

weapons of mass destruction.

I do not believe you can accomplish that with air power alone. And if air power is sent out as sort of an instrument of revenge that makes people pull back for a week or a month, it still has not necessarily changed their minds, and I believe as soon as the bombers go away, the same people will be looking for alternative methods to ply their hatred and biases and whatever.

So in my prepared statement which I will not beat to death this morning since you didn't ask for it, I talk more about the need to establish a strategy for reestablishing law and order and I believe that the laws, the international laws to which we should respond should be generated by the United Nations. And I believe we should establish regional organizations to enforce those laws.

One of the worst things you could do in the current situation in my mind is sort of repeat the Vietnam caper, but replace LBJ by what's his name, BBG. You cannot let a pacifist or a minister or a politician run a crime prevention campaign. You do not want to get into a situation where you are beholden to some committee of the United Nations as to how you proceed with the details of police or military operations.

So again, the idea that you have authority to bomb this week but you may lose the authority to bomb next week or somebody may decide it wasn't politically such a good idea, is not good enough. You know, this has happened in Somalia: Aideed was a villain one week, and a respected authority the next week. This kind of game

is not going to, in any way, solve the problem in Bosnia.

So I believe you have to take a much longer range and more careful view that involves the people on the ground, involves other agencies and all together works much harder at the problem than

the convenience of bombing something.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan, I appreciate your comments. I basically agree with your thoughts. I have said on numerous occasions discussing this issue and others, that if we were to have a New World Order it was an order in which international crime would be culpable, accountable and sanctioned by action, so

I think your basic premise is absolutely correct.

The problem that we have, let me ask you to respond to this, is that we have before us an immediate, on-going situation. There was an incident that occurred almost 30 years ago involving Kitty Genovese, I don't know whether that name rings a bell with any of you. She was a young woman brutally murdered outside her home while 38 of her neighbors, who heard her cries for help, did nothing. I refer to it sort of picturesquely as Kitty Genocide. It is very nice to sit in the apartment building and to intellectualize about how we enforce law and order and what weapons we use to do that and how effective they will be, but Kitty Genovese only had a certain period of time to hope for action. Now that may be a simplistic analogy. I understand all analogies limp and that one perhaps limps, but I am struck by the fact that I offered a resolution in Copenhagen at a Parliamentary Assembly meeting some few weeks ago, which was vigorously opposed by British and French. It was the same as they had essentially done when Mr. McCloskey, a member of this Commission, and Mr. Moran, not a member of this Commission, but very active on this issue, offered a similar resolution at the Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Helsinki to rearm, to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians. We felt this was a small step, but that resolution, Mr. McCloskey has just entered the room, was defeated. Essentially, the English and the French and others defeated it on the grounds that if you did that, you would escalate the carnage and you would put at risk the some 20,000 UNPROFOR troops that are on the ground. I frankly think that the General who observed that the UNPROFOR troops were essentially masking western inaction is correct. The UNPROFOR troops essentially don't protect anybody. As a matter of fact their directions are not to protect anybody, not to effect law and order, but to deliver the humanitarian aid. I think that's a positive step.

But Mr. Silajdzic, who is the Prime Minister of Bosnia, believes that they are undermining the cause of law and order, not furthering it because they are a pretext by the west that we are doing something to bring resolution or at least relief. And Mr. Silajdzic, the Prime Minister, believes that they are simply an excuse for in-

action.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Could I respond to that?

Co-Chairman HOYER. Yes sir.

Mr. Sullivan. Let me hit Kitty Genovese first. I think I was still in New York at that time. I'm not sure. I used to live on Long Island. You know I shared the shame of a great many New Yorkers about the fact that nobody responded at that time, but to, if I may, in a somewhat flip way, continue the parallel, we weren't embarrassed because nobody bombed the streets of New York. We were embarrassed that nobody called the police. We recognized it as a crime that has to be treated within the bounds of civility, even though the crime was committed by somebody who operates outside

the bounds of civility.

So I just think be careful with the Kitty business only because it doesn't lead to Kitty bombing or whatever you want to call it. It leads to taking an appropriate reaction. Lest I be misunderstood, Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that I firmly believe that we are at least 18 months late in taking firm actions, but they are not just bombing things. They are establishing the intelligence we need, the communications we need, the target designation that we need, the responsive capabilities that we need, the police that we need, the economic sanctions that we need, the political sanctions that we need, all of these things are elements in reestablishing law and order in that part of the world.

I don't want to let you off the hook that a few bombs dropped in a few different places will solve the problem, because in the long run it will not, although I understand that it will feel good. When I wake up in the morning I often think I'd like to bomb something, but in all the times I've seen it done it very seldom was in the long

run helpful.

Let me come back, if I now may, and I apologize for talking so much, I think about this an awful lot. You cannot fight crime if you are not allowed to accept casualties. And one of the other things I find so unreal are congressman or senators or presidents who say well, we can't really take bloodshed in this kind of operation, we're

only in it to bomb or to do something within three months and get out.

Imagine a crime fighter saying that, well, the next time a policeman gets hurt in Northeast Washington, we're going to pull them all out or not fund them any longer. Or apologize to somebody.

The retention and the maintenance of law and order, fire prevention, civility, morality, ethics are things that people get hurt for and people die for. And if in fact, we have set up a situation where we have sent people into Bosnia to help, but who cannot be harmed themselves, then I agree, we have done something very counter-

productive.

Now let me just say one other thing and I will stop talking. I at many times in my life have been puzzled by people who seemed to me to be wallowing in inactivity. And when I'm just about exhausted and want to bomb them, I try to figure out if there isn't some reason for that inactivity. And I think the reason here is that a lot of thoughtful people, and a lot of thoughtful people associated classically with the military, understand that these limited actions will not solve the problem. And escalation in some form is likely to take place unless you are prepared to do more and so I believe you have to do many things and that we should have started doing it a long time ago. Bombing is not, by itself, the answer to that problem. They may back off for a couple of weeks and maybe there is some value in having a couple of weeks' respite, but they'll be back and they will not just enter a period of reconciliation because you bombed something. And particularly if you only bombed the artillery. You've got to go after the command and logistic infrastructure and back it up so people understand they're not free to continue to do it.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Sullivan, I agree with most of your points. I don't know about the rest of the panel members that—I don't want you deluded or anybody else deluded that I think that bombing is the sole and separate response. I am absolutely convicted of the fact though that if you threaten bombing, month after month, six months after six months, as the United Nations has done, as NATO has done, and take no action, that there is a very clear signal and message to Milosevic, Karadzic and the others.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Indeed. Indeed, but maybe the original threat was

wrong.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Perhaps. A note just to finish my initial point. Kitty Genovese's killer returned twice to finish her off. He didn't kill her the first time. And it was a period of about 35 minutes. Let me suggest to you the police have been called. The police are knowledgeable. The police have far more power than necessary to stop the criminal activity. I agree with you one hundred percent that it is not risk free. Law enforcement is never risk free as we tragically learn annually, as we lose law enforcement officers in this nation. But the answer is not to withdraw law enforcement officials from the scene.

I've got other questions, but let me recognize Mr. Cardin and also recognize the presence of Mr. Smith, the ranking Republican member of the Commission, who is very involved, and has visited Yugoslavia and Bosnia on a number of occasions and Mr. Frank McClossiavia

key, who probably is as outspoken a member on this issue as there is in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Cardin?

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you.

Mr. Kurspahic, I appreciate and agree with your statement as to the need for us to have a plan and not be persuaded by the Euro-

pean community to join their inaction.

I think the American people have seen, night after night on television, some of the atrocities that are taking place in Bosnia. They've seen the killings. However, I'm not sure though they quite understand the seriousness of the lack of water, electricity, fuel, medical equipment, or food. Would either Mr. Rosenblatt or Mr. Kurspahic, tell us a little bit more vividly the current situation in that region.

Can people turn on their faucets and get water? Can they turn their thermostats up at night to get enough heat? Can they go to their pantries or grocery stores in order to get food? What is the current situation this winter, as it relates to the essential commod-

ities and utilities, for the people that are living in Sarajevo?

Mr. Kurspahic. As I said, it's a windowless and heatingless city in the mid-st of Sarajevo winter, that was winter Olympic city and it is a harsh winter. There is no water except if you walk for a few hundred meters or a few kilometers for it. I did not have any running water in my apartment for maybe 18 months or longer. To get to the water, you have to risk snipers and mortars, any line in Sarajevo is intentionally targeted, water queue, bread line, market place, whenever there is a group of people because they feel more productive killing more people by one shell than sniping one by one.

So there is a risk even to get the water. There is a risk even to get humanitarian aid when it's brought to your neighborhood, like that massacre in Dobrinja. There is no electricity and when there is no electricity there are no phone lines even within the city. That's why I mentioned that a phone system should be brought to Sarajevo, and it is kept someplace just because of some paperwork

here in this country.

There are all kinds of basic needs. There is no bread for two or three weeks in the city when a bakery is hit which happens very often. And that's why I referred to that humanitarian misery as one of three death sentences against Sarajevo.

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Rosenblatt?

Mr. Rosenblatt. I might just add ten days ago when I was in Sarajevo, I visited a collective center that was being insulated around the broken windows for the first time in 22 months with something heavier than the very flimsy plastic that the U.N. makes available. It was so cold in there that people were wearing what they would to go out skiing, layers and layers of clothes, sweaters, ski parkas and pants, for the lucky ones. It was so damp that you could feel the walls and feel moisture come off on your fingers. It was so smoky from the one small stove that was installed to try to provide a little heat that we began to cough as soon as we entered the building. There are many, many people living in these conditions. These individuals were refugees into Sarajevo when the fighting first began. They've lived in the so-called collective center

now for 22 months. I don't know how they've survived, it is that

miserable for many people.

Today, as we speak, there's no electricity, as I mentioned earlier. The Serbs have refused to allow a repair crew to go out. Electricity is a very important key to many people being able to cook, to many people being able to run small heaters. There is, at the same time, no fuel. Fuel is the key, diesel fuel, to the water situation. As bad as it is to line up for water in the open, if there's no diesel fuel. it's not even pumped to those taps, so getting the diesel fuel into Sarajevo making it clear to the Serbs those deliveries will have to continue using all means necessary to delivery those convoys is very, very important. But it's a city that is incredible in its wretchedness, and yet, it's incredible in its resistance to the suffering. People come out from those buildings still with a determination to carry on and that's one reason why several of us who have been there continue to go back, why we admire the spirit of Oslobodenje

I might, if I could, if I'm not out of order, just add my perspective on this issue of air strikes. Air strikes are not perfect. We ought to have long ago had an international force on the ground, but at a certain point the risk of inaction outweighs the risk of action. As I said, if we sit there and watch the city pulverized before our eyes, the Serbs are going to get the message and within a very short time artillery will intensify making the death toll of last Saturday

looking like child's play.

The threat of air strikes has to be made a viable one. I think if that threat is translated into action, there will be a tendency on the part of the Serbs to rethink. The last time they thought air strikes were coming they huddled in Pale. They huddled in Athens. They began to realize that maybe they had reached the limits of their aggression. They are the aggressor. They don't need this terri-

tory. We're not fighting them on their hinterland.

We have got to move ahead. There's a framework here. It's not an act of revenge, it's not to make us feel good tomorrow morning or even this morning, whatever morning we're talking about. We're talking about resolutions of the Security Council that call for the defense of safe havens. At a certain point, when those safe havens are manifestly unsafe, dangerous to human life, we need to consider following through on what the Security Council has mandated. I agree fully that that can't be an isolated air strike. It has to be a continuing campaign, if necessary. They have to know that it will be a continuing price to pay, but you have to start that process at some point and hope the credible threat of that will bring the aggressors to a more rational course.

Thank you for letting me say that.

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Rosenblatt, I appreciate that additional comment. I want to clarify the one point you both have testified very vividly as to the inability of the people to get supplies because of the actions taken by the Serbs.

Can we assume that there is adequate international resources available and that the principal problem is the international community's inability to get the assistance to the people because of security problems and the aggression?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. There are two answers to that. A year ago I would have said there is an absolute resource problem. There was. Now, there are adequate dollars. The warehouses are full. One reason is that there are so many blockages on the ground that the throughput of humanitarian assistance is much lower than it was last year at this time. So we would have a resource problem if we were able to deliver at the means that are required.

We would have a truck shortage, for example, if more convoys were getting through. We'd have a carbohydrate shortage and cer-

tainly an oil fat shortage in the diet that's being provided.

Mr. CARDIN. At this point, it's not the lack of supplies, it's the

ability to deliver the supplies?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Correct. As I said earlier at this point, it's being able to use all means necessary to open up the supply lines. This is the reason why Tuzla airport is so important, why the routes in from the Dalmatian coast are so important with the threat of sanctions to Croatia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would ask

that my statement be made a part of the record.

I do apologize for being late and missing the testimony. This is my fourth hearing today, three of which have been about difficult issues, the rise of global anti-Semitism and another was on China and the deteriorating human rights situation there.

Sitting through these hearings and hearing expert testimony, I am reminded of the tragedy in our world today. Sometimes we forget about the suffering because we live in a relatively safe haven

here in the United States.

A couple of questions, Mr. Sullivan. There have been reports suggesting that the Bosnian military has really been revamping itself, becoming more, not less, of a credible force. The reports suggest that given additional time and lifting of the arms embargo, the Bosnians would have the capability of pushing some of the aggressors out of their land.

Do you concur with that assessment?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes sir. Yes. I can either say yes or yes and expand it and the trouble is I'll expand further.

It is essential in this kind of operation to have the participation, the full participation of the victims, the resistance movement,

whatever you want to call it.

This is not the kind of a thing you can solve by strikes and bombing over the heads of the people who are there. And the more you talk about arming the Bosnians, the friendly Bosnians, if you will, giving them tasks to do, letting them have something to say about the selection of targets, letting them have something to say about whether they will accept casualties in the distribution of relief supplies, then you are beginning to engage the people and you are beginning to undertake an operation that has some chances of success and these are the types of things that I believe will make the criminals change their mind.

I understand that you can send a telegram with a 2,000 pound bomb and I understand that that will make people think for a

while. I just don't believe that you can protect a safe haven with bombs and let me suggest at least some alternatives.

I don't believe you have modern mortar and artillery detector systems in Sarajevo. I believe you're using a Ukrainian peacekeep-

ing unit that is probably using third class Soviet equipment.

We have equipment that can tell you where a mortar or an artillery shell is coming from with great precision indeed. Now how can there be any objection to at least providing the type of equipment that allows you to know who the bad guy is or where he shot from? Once you've done that, what is the harm at shooting back at him with some weapon system on the ground? Why does it have to be an air strike? If they're smart enough to use mortars, certainly the Bosnians can use mortars. If they're smart enough to use artillery, why shouldn't the defenders use artillery? It is timely. If you do it right, you can begin to shoot back before the shell hits.

There are all kinds of better and more personal ways to engage

this enemy than the remoteness of the air strikes.

Yes, engage the Bosnian military, any way you can.

Mr. SMITH. And is it your sense they have been improving——Mr. SULLIVAN. I can't tell you. I simply don't know. I have no insider information on it. I am not associated with any current mili-

tary organization.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Kurspahic, what is the feeling among the people on the ground, particularly in Sarajevo, with respect to the presence of U.N. forces. Is there a sense of being let down, and discouragement?

Mr. KURSPAHIC. As I said in my testimony, the only resolution implemented in Sarajevo is the one preventing the victim to defend itself which is the arms embargo and what is the most ironic is

that embargo against Bosnia even doesn't exist.

Everything else in U.N. presence there was failure since the beginning. You have peacekeepers in a country where there is no peace to keep, with no mandate to act and with no resolve behind them to act. I appreciate very much the risks they take in humanitarian assistance and Bosnians appreciate that very much, but for Bosnians, for Sarajevans, there is no point in giving us some food just to be killed next day without any protection.

All other U.N. resolutions, safe haven, I shouldn't tell anything else but that Sarajevo was a safe haven with Saturday's massacre

and the seriousness of that.

There was a resolution on control of heavy weaponry and we had some hopes about that and U.N. observers became like waiters at the end of the day, just taking account how many rounds we had at different places and they would report that there was sometimes a few hundreds to one, that's the relationship between number of shells which hit Sarajevan civilian neighborhoods and number of shells from defense position. I would just like to add to what Mr. Sullivan said, Bosnian army has improved miraculously.

Defense of Sarajevo itself is a miracle. The only thing is that that army has its hands tied by the embargo against huge military power. All weapons of former Yugoslav army, hundreds of heavy artillery pieces are used against unarmed civilians, but there is manpower and there is willingness and there is high improved

army discipline that's respected for an army without means to de-

Mr. SMITH. Would it be your view that the air strikes, especially if linked to lifting of the arms embargo, would buy additional time

so that modernization could continue?

Mr. KURSPAHIC. I personally think that combination of measures would work and I mentioned lift, arm, strike, squeeze and try those responsible for crimes. That would work as a cocktail, not a single measure.

You never talked about air strikes only and the other thing, Bosnia never asked for mass ground troops involvement. There was no request of that kind. Bosnia has manpower, has the army, but doesn't have means and I think in combination of those things, the situation would change.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Rosenblatt, I've read your statement since coming here and it is really a firm call for action, pointing out that fur-

ther delay is no longer an acceptable option and I thank you.

For so many years, we all have discussed various issues with NGOs, but very seldom does a humanitarian, nongovernmental organization say that the use of force is necessary in order to protect those who are being slaughtered.

I remember Ethiopia and so many countries or situations where the NGOs were silent about the armed option. Your support indicates just how desperate the situation is. Thank you for your testi-

mony. Do you wish to comment on that?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Yes, I'd like to respond to that, thank you, Mr. Smith. I just wanted to add that this view is shared by many of

the agencies that are working on the ground.

We visit there frequently. We're an advocacy agency and not a program agency, but I was struck that two months ago on a visit to Sarajevo, all of the agencies signed a document urging that immediate sanctions be placed on the Croatians in terms of opening up the roots of access, so many of us subscribe to 836, the Security Council resolution which calls for using all means necessary to deliver humanitarian aid.

It's sad that we've come to this impasse. Had we acted earlier, we wouldn't be at this juncture, as Margaret Thatcher so elo-

quently reminded us the other day.

I would just add that we have a number of ways in which this city is being strangled, the utilities, the shells and sniping; sniping is a big, big problem, even when the shelling subsides, the snipers

are still there.

The very little relief that's getting through, and that would certainly include bringing weapons in. It's no easy matter to bring weapons into a city under siege. At this stage, bringing them the counter battery capability that we've just heard described would be very difficult unless again U.S. policy and NATO policy changed and there was an active delivery mode for that material.

This is why you've got to rely, I think, on the targeting that's been done already by the NATO air strike force. Not perfect, not that I'm against weapons moving to the Bosnian side. I think that's got to be part of the equation, but these recommendations have to recognize that access to Sarajevo is only by an U.N. airlift where the Serbs have the right to veto everything coming in. The Serbs

are not going to permit that equipment to come in. It would have to be brought in, in a sophisticated military resupply operation, putting people proudly on the ground that we recognize.

All of our recommendations are based on the fact that we all recognize that ground troops, additional ground troops from this coun-

try or the European countries are unlikely.

Let me add one more word from an NGO perspective and that is that all three parties in Central Bosnia needed to be reminded of the need to not do further violence to civilians. There is a Bosnian counter offensive as their capabilities grow in the Vitez area, and we want to be on record of saying as we told them privately, ten days ago in Sarajevo, that we're concerned. They should not begin to shell civilians. They should not begin to do to the civilians they now are surrounding what has been done by the Serbs and the Croats and that's another reason I think for action from the U.N. at this stage or the cycle of violence will simply perpetuate itself.

Mr. SMITH. Just one brief final question, Mr. Kurspahic. It is often related in the press that many Muslims believe there would have been a swifter response if there had been someone else in Sa-

rajevo and Bosnia.

I'm reminded of the fact that when the war broke out between Serbia and Croatia and the arms embargo was placed on all of the former Yugoslavia, I and many others, including members of this Commission, the distinguished Chairman and Mr. McCloskey and others spoke out as to how inappropriate that policy was. Owing to the fact that the Croats had very little and the Serbs had almost all of the fire power, we feared that it would to be a slaughter, Croatia would be conquered, and Bosnia would be next on the list.

In Croatia, obviously, most of the population is Catholic, but there was no cry to repeal the embargo and no effective way of repealing the arms embargo. I would hope we could erase the mistaken impression that had the people under siege not been a Muslim population that action would have been taken. When the Croats withered on the vine, very little was done, and then Bosnia

was next

Would you comment on that? Is there a widespread feeling of

abandonment by the Muslim population?

Mr. Kurspahic. There is such feeling, but I have to tell you that siege of Sarajevo is not siege of Muslims only. Serbian artillery shelling my neighborhood can't discriminate. They kill Serbs. In that marketplace massacre, there were Serbs massacred, too. There are 80,000 Serbs sharing that terror and being exposed to Serbian fascism the same way all Bosnians are, and there is one confusing element in reporting from Bosnia. You know, I recently read just one sentence talking about impasse in peace talks between three warring factions in the civil war in Bosnia over Bosnian government requests the Serbs to give them more of their territory and the Croats to not only give them access, but sovereignty over the sea. There is all kinds of confusion which I believe is intentional in order to give you an excuse not to act. Then you refer, like Lord Owen does, being almost like spokesmen for Serbian cause and Tudjman's, because their peace proposal is the one put down by

Milosevic and Tudjman who have the common goal to divide Bosnia.

That's European Community's proposal to which you are invited

to press Bosnians to accept.

When you refer to them as warring factions then you confuse the fact that one of them is democratically elected government of internationally recognized state and then there is an excuse not to get

involved on that side.

Second, about territories. A year and a half ago, we didn't have one town which could be claimed as Muslim, Serbian or Croat exclusively. Those were towns with people living there for centuries together, people of different religious and ethnic backgrounds and now that's the request by Bosnians to Serbs to give them some more of their territory. The Serbs didn't have any territory, in fact, they had 100 percent of Bosnia, being free citizens there like anyone else.

Or these days there have been reports of Bosnian army attacking Croat town of Vitez. It's confusing because Vitez wasn't a Croat town. It's Croat-occupied and Croat-held town. There were Muslims

and Croats living in that town for centuries.

So Bosnian army attacking or trying to liberate towns which were occupied, had some different moral ground for that. And you know, dealing with three warring factions and confusing the fact that that was a state, recognized within its borders, that there was a government of that state, elected in internationally supervised elections in November '90, bringing them to the same level as those criminals destroying the country, then you have some excuses not to act.

So I don't consider that personally as anti-Muslim. That's anti-Bosnian and instead of talking about civil war, I believe that it's the war against civilization, against culture of tolerance, of multi-ethnic tradition of that country, of cosmopolitan spirit of Sarajevo

which we all witnessed ten years ago.

What is happening to Bosnia is not centuries old hatreds there. You have centuries old evidences of cultures living together. There's churches of four major religions side by side which no one touched in first and second World War in fact. They are regularly

targeted now.

That's imported. By existence of Greater Serbian Project which was developed by Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade, imported by Yugoslav Army which was the only army operating on that soil. On the day Bosnia was attacked, it didn't have any army, so it wasn't a war. It was massacre, terror, genocide, but not a war. For war, you need two armies fighting each other. Bosnia didn't have the army on the day it was attacked. That was the first day of its international recognition.

It's imported by presence and deeds of Serbian paramilitary units coming to Bosnia and doing some of the worse crimes in that ethnic cleansing campaign. And it's imported in the sense that even those who organize terror within Bosnia itself, Karadzic, and those around him, never belonged to that culture of living together. They came from elsewhere. That's imported and imposed on Bosnia and there was no centuries old hatred in that city or in that country.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. McCloskey. Mr. McCloskey. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and firstly, I want to again commend you and Mr. DeConini for all your leadership and courage in pursuing this issue all along and needless to say, in Chris Smith, we have one of the most stellar, decent and courageous members of the House. Anything to do with human rights anywhere, Chris Smith is right there and I want to apologize to all three of our guests, particularly Mr. Sullivan. I had the benefit of an extended interview with him yesterday, that I was so late.

Leonard, the only reason I was late though, there was another meeting with Bosnia implications that promised more up-to-date military and technological information. It turned out I didn't get

much of that, but that's why I was not here.

I do want to say that I think right now we are obviously at a watershed. The events of Saturday very likely are a solid base for a definite change in American and western response and attitudes on this issue and just looking at and hearing the media this morning, and let's see, ultimately if this is true, check me out, but I think in the last several days, Mr. Chairman, since Saturday, if I'm not mistaken, we've had one of the most massive public opinion turnabouts of all time on a significant issue. I know, because you've seen the polls on TV in the last two or three days and it was true in my district in recent polling that the American public was disposed 5 to 1 against any military intervention in this Bosnian conflict.

This morning, the Gallup poll changed 48 to 43. That is saying we should do air strikes on the Serbs, I'm using that figure in a congressional message that is going to get extensive support to Mr. Clinton and I've been told by the Action in Bosnia Council, I believe, I haven't seen it, but the ABC report has extended the numbers even more so.

I know we're getting a big turnaround in the House and more and more congressional leaders are speaking out and really focus-

ing on this issue.

I was very gratified that Lee Hamilton, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, yesterday called for limited air strikes and I'm a biased Hoosier maybe, but you don't have to be a Hoosier to

know that when Lee Hamilton talks, a lot of people listen.

I think it's very important that people of good will convey to President Clinton that he will have our support for lifting the arms embargo and the air strikes. There's going to be some bad and evil effects, but if we allow this to go on as, Steny, as you have been saying for more than a year, we can lose a region, we can lose a people, and I think ultimately we're going to lose our own self-respect in history.

I was very appreciative that we did get around to some aspect as to, aspects of this conflict as far as the Croatian dialogue and problems. I first got involved in this issue in December 1991 after a visit to Croatia. My initial efforts were out of concern for the Croatian people being victimized by Serb aggression. Since that time, perhaps due to indifference by the west, Mr. Tudjman, with whom I've met on several occasions to say the least, has more and more

taken a page out of the book of Mr. Milosevic. He has signed some

sort of reciprocity treaty about two weeks ago with Milosevic.

Quite frankly, in conversations with Tudjman over the years, I could hardly ever get him to say anything critical about Milosevic. Bosnia, the Bosnian nation and people, are in a position of being caught between the Croatian and Serbian pincers, and the suggested partition, by the way, leaves nothing, I think, for the long run, but to dysfunctional Bosnia islets that will have no future, no place in history and nothing, mostly will provide nothing but a basis for more trouble.

I wonder if I could ask Mr. Kurspahic to comment on that. Why do you think the Croats became like that, particularly in Central Bosnia? Did they have to do that? I've told them all along that there's nothing but death and destruction coming out of this, and that the Croatians will have little sympathy from the world even though the fact that the Serbs now occupy 30 percent of Croatia. Could you comment on that aspect of the tragedy, Mr. Kurspahic?

Anthony Lewis in a comment which I basically agreed with everything said that air strikes and interdicting the Croatian supply lines going into Central Bosnia now, so it's one of the most, I'd say formal and potentially influential calls for more serious treatment of the Croatian danger in all this, when Mostar has even been more ravaged by the Croatians, quite frankly, or at least as much and in its own way as Sarajevo has been besieged. We cannot forget the endangered people in Mostar either.

Thank you, Mr. Kurspahic.

Mr. KURSPAHIC. I have to tell you that since the beginning, I felt that Milosevic and Tudjman were political twins. I believe that Milosevic has produced Tudjman. The day that Tudjman was elected in Croatia, I wrote a column telling that first letter of gratitude he should send to Milosevic because appearance of strong man in Serbia was invitation for strong man in Croatia. And they had a meeting in March 1991 in Tito's villa in Karadjordjevo. After that, long after they had that meeting that they had some agreement to divide Bosnia and that's what is happening at present, encouraged by international inaction. Because if international community dealt with Serbian aggression in the first place, Tudjman wouldn't do because he would be more sensitive to threats of international sanctions or international action. He was waiting and then Bosnia was massacred by Serbs the way it was. Then he decided, encouraged by European-sponsored peace talks, by Owens' design to divide the country, proclaiming parts of Bosnia as Croat Republic within Bosnia, the same way as Serbian Republic, and that brought all the terror in Central Bosnia.

When you proclaim large parts of a country as a state within the state, ethnic exclusive state of Croat Republic of Herze-Bosnia, in which in all major towns, like Mostar, Bugojno, Travnik, Konjic and some others, there were more Muslims than Croats living there according to the Census in 1991. You proclaim it Croat exclusive. Asking to disarm Bosnian army, Bosnian police, to introduce Croat exclusive schools, it's invitation for terror and that's what is

happening there.

I think that mentality of partition, of apartheid, which was introduced by international efforts in Bosnia is directly responsible for

that terror in parts of the country which were claimed as one or the other group exclusive and that's why I think that what is offered in Geneva and what Bosnian government is terribly pressed to sign is invitation for new years of ethnic violence and cleansing because if you want to produce three states within the state, Muslim, Croat and Serbian, there are still hundreds of thousands of people to suffer for that.

So I think it's not only wrong because it legalizes crimes committed, it's invitation for new crimes and that's why I'm against that.

Mr. McCloskey. Well, thank you. I guess I'd like to ask of Mr. Kurspahic, particularly, but also, maybe if Leonard Sullivan wants to observe.

Leonard, when you were talking to me yesterday, I was particularly intrigued with your suggestion of what you call confidence destroying measures, in essence, to make it really miserable for the Bosnian Serb and Serbian gunners on those hills to go to work physically and psychologically. So it is true that the simple act of air strikes doesn't get the job done, but I guess one of the shudders that goes through my mind and it comes up in a discussion about this is, as Larry Eagleberger liked to run it.

We can't really do anything on this because as Mr. Eagleburger said, "I know how bad the Serbs can be." When we think about the people in Zepce, Srebrenica and Tuzla and it comes up, well, if we liberate Sarajevo, how about those Bosnians of all ages out in the

outlying enclaves. Will they be immediately slaughtered?

Mr. Kurspahic, could you comment on that? Obviously, there's

much we can do to minimize that.

Mr. KURSPAHIC. I think there is on-going slaughter against Bosnians in all territories. There is no functional safe haven there.

They can't be terrorized more than they are.

I think excuses, that taking action would escalate violence, are cynical because there is one-sided violence, so I think there is a need to act, of course, with all additional sacrifices that we might have, but we can't really allow that to continue without taking any

action to prevent, to stop that.
I'm in favor of action, and I believe so is the majority of people there. There was that same excuse by the Allied Forces in the 1940's. They decided not to bomb Auschwitz because they were afraid that the Nazis might take more vindicative actions, as if there was anything worse that those people could suffer, or as there is anything worse that we can suffer than we do now, so I think Bosnians are in favor of action, even if that involves some terrible things that might be done against us, the worst has already happened.

Mr. McCloskey. I dare say, when you consider nutritional and sanitary and other problems and the atrocities out there in the areas outside of Sarajevo, I just think it's going to be months or years before we get the full story on the horrible conditions. They haven't had the media access and coverage in many cases that Sa-

rajevo has. I just grimace in horror at the thought of it!

Mr. KURSPAHIC. Yes, I'm afraid that those horrible spectacles like bombing of the marketplace in Sarajevo might be used as a smokescreen for equally terrible things in the countryside where you don't have access.

It's possible that things there are even worse.

Mr. McCloskey. General McPeak, I guess, is still saying that we can be very effective and do much of the job with air strikes, Mr. Sullivan, but do you have any further comment on that, particularly as to the idea of Serb atrocities in the outlying areas, retribution on not only Bosnians, but humanitarian workers and others who maybe caught in the vise?

It's interesting. They'll say, we can't do anything, but continue to do this maintenance number and feed the Serb gunners because if we do air strikes, they'll hit the British and French troops, but the French more and more are asking for air strikes and a more active

military role.

Mr. Sullivan. I think the worst thing you could do, sir, is allow these air strikes to be conducted only by people who have developed their own target lists, independent of what the victims think

should be struck, when and how.

What I'm particularly worried about when you let anybody's Air Force go on their own, they hit their own targets of preference and those are not necessarily the ones that are the most important here.

Let me be a little more clear. I think if Tony McPeak says he can take out the bridges across the rivers so that it's harder to get logistic resupply from the outside, I think that's absolutely correct.

If somebody has told you where the telephone central is that Milosevic uses, and you don't want him to use it anymore, I think the Air Force can take it out, or the Navy can probably take it out with a cruise missile. And I don't know whether that's an air strike or not.

The closer you get though, to personal atrocities, the mixing of the two sides, the changing of hands of villages at night, as used to happen in Vietnam, the harder it is to call in outsiders to bomb the right thing. As a matter of fact, it's pretty easy to game that situation and you'll end up bombing a school or a hospital or 600 nuns or something just because you weren't on the ground.

I feel very strongly that there has to be some ground support for air activities and I don't see any point in going into all the details,

but you can improve the accuracy of the falling bomb-

Mr. McCloskey. Much of that could be with Bosnians trained as

operatives, wouldn't you say?

Mr. Sullivan. Yes sir. And you don't have to train them with military forces. I think you have to play games here with what constitutes military forces on the ground in that country and does that rule out agents of other law enforcement agencies? Can Customs agents go in? Can FAA people go in? Can ATF be there? Can CIA be there? There are all kinds of people who can help with this thing.

So again, I'm going to caution you against expecting too much from the air strikes and I know this is part of the concern of the military. They're proud of what they can do and yet they hate to admit the things they can't do. You know, like changing people's minds or worrying about what they do the following day or where

they do and retaliate somewhere else.

So in fact, I have absolutely no foundation on which to say this, but I do believe things could get worse in Bosnia and I think you ought to try and avoid that if you can.

ought to try and avoid that if you can.

Mr. McCloskey. Maybe just one concluding question again to
Mr. Kurspahic. At least implicitly I asked it already, if not explic-

itly, but I don't know that it was answered.

Would you say if the Croatians don't get into a more peaceful frame, pull back on their regular forces, and bring in military supplies into this, that their lines and forces should suffer similar

treatment as to what we're talking about for the Serbians?

Mr. KURSPAHIC. I believe there is no place for Croat forces within Bosnia, as there is no place for Serbian forces, so it was reported at the end of last week, that there were 3,000 to 5,000 Croat soldiers on Bosnian soil, and I believe that's enough for serious consideration of sanctions and other measures to prevent that kind of unlawful behavior on any side.

Mr. McCloskey. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I really ap-

preciate it. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, again.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. Obviously, we could go on with questions for the balance of the afternoon. I think, however, we have dramatized three different aspects of this problem.

Mr. Rosenblatt, clearly you have compellingly, I think, demonstrated the humanitarian situation from an outsider's standpoint. Obviously, you've been there a lot and I too, as Mr. Smith, is struck by the fact that there is such a growing consensus among humanitarian groups, either operational or advocacy groups for greater action than what is being taken.

Mr. Kurspahic, obviously you talk about your neighborhood being shelled. A neighborhood in which Serbs, Croatians, Bosnians, members of different faiths have lived for some period of time in rel-

ative harmony.

Let me ask you a question. I was about to end, but let me ask you one question. I mentioned that Mr. Silajdzic has testified before this committee that the UNPROFOR troops, if that is all that was offered, that it would be preferable to withdraw them and to lift the arms embargo and allow the Bosnians themselves to defend themselves.

Do you believe that is still Mr. Silajdzic's opinion and do you

share that opinion?

Mr. Kurspahic. I personally don't know Mr. Silajdzic's opinion, but I think that if U.N. presence there is excuse not to act, if we are told that we can't be protected because of those who came to protect us, then personally I would like them to withdraw if that is followed by real action which means lifting of embargo, arming of Bosnians and even air strikes against artillery positions to establish a balance and I believe more favorable atmosphere, conditions for negotiating settlement, because if there is some balance we would have more chances to open a peace process. But I think the one which we are witnessing for many months now is designed to fail since the beginning because it was based on apartheid as solution for a country. And, I don't see any solution in that.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you. Mr. Markey, who is a member of this Commission, a very active member of this Commission,

could not be here because he's chairing another hearing. He had a couple of questions. He had a number of questions which I will submit, but I'd like to ask two of them.

Besides your newspaper, Mr. Kurspahic, how do residents of Sa-

rajevo get their news?

Mr. Kurspahic. For many days and weeks during this siege, the paper was the only source of news because there is no electricity to listen to the radio or watch television. Very few people have batteries and we all exhausted our car batteries to which we connected radios and TV sets. You can use it for a few days and then it gets exhausted and there is no electricity to recharge it.

So the paper was for a very long time the only source of news. It's shared by ten families or even more in apartment buildings

and of course, that's not enough.

Co-Chairman HOYER. You had mentioned the telephone service. Mr. Rosenblatt, this is a question that Mr. Markey had asked. Would you support turning over the delivery of humanitarian relief deliveries to the Bosnian authorities, removing the U.N. peace-keepers from the ground and instead using air strikes to stop Serb shelling of Sarajevo?

That's really two questions, but it relates to the question I just propounded with reference to Mr. Silajdzic's view on withdrawing

UNPROFOR.

What do you think about turning over the delivery of relief mate-

rials to Bosnian authorities?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. I would prefer to see a reinforced aggressive UNPROFOR as my first choice. The new commandant in Sarajevo, a British general, is I think, going to try to push more aggressively for the delivery of humanitarian aid. This means at checkpoint getting the Serbs to believe that you'll bring in your warrior armored vehicles. He's done that now a couple of times and one hopes that

that more aggressive posture will continue to work.

Co-Chairman HOYER. On that issue, before you go further on that. We heard testimony by José Mendiluce, who served as Special Envoy of the U.N.H.C.R. in the former Yugoslavia, some months ago, that UNPROFOR forces delivering humanitarian aid were, in fact, being interdicted, stopped and turned around by sole, relatively elderly, armed with what appeared to be single shot rifles, simply on the assertion that the Serbs would not allow you to use this road at this time for the delivery of services.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. That's correct. The convoys are being turned back by two and three individuals, often paramilitary or so-called police with antiquated weapons, because the Serbs have made clear that if you proceed, you'll pay the consequences, so the challenge is to within the UNPROFOR mandate which now is, has been for some time to deliver humanitarian assistance by all means necessary, to use the means on the ground more aggressively. And

General Rose, the new commander, has been trying this.

I doubt that that can be successful for very long without additional force such as a credible threat of air strikes. But again, it's got to be united into a panoply of actions. If the UNPROFOR personnel feel they can't maintain their mission, this is the second part of your question, and if they have become targets and they're

taking casualties, I think that the political pressures will be on

them to the point that they will withdraw at that point.

At that point only, you would shift to the Bosnians and my thinking, because UNPROFOR, with all its frailties, does have a convoy system, does have vehicles, does have experience in delivering to the recipients. That would take a long time for the Bosnians to duplicate.

We have to be sure that UNPROFOR doesn't cut and run prematurely. I think our job is to make sure the environment is such

that they're not forced to do that.

Co-Chairman HOYER. So then lastly, just let me ask for your observation, and again, I make these analogies and realize they're simplistic and therefore not very credible, but I supported President Reagan's strike at Kadafi, and my lesson from that which may be a very simplistic lesson, it certainly did change conduct. Obviously, the strike did not occur within a war setting, nor involve an adjacent country setting—it was a relatively isolated event, but it seems to me it did, in fact, have a pretty significant effect on Libyan action, Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. I do not, by any stretch of the imagination, say that it stopped, but it seemed to be modified.

I am one, for instance, who has advocated in effect, telling Mr. Milosevic, that we will take out infrastructure in and around Belgrade in a relatively surgical way, perhaps not painless, but similar to what you said in terms of ammunition dumps, other supply centers, things of that nature. I don't think anybody is contemplating that at this point in time, at least publicly, but just comment on that.

It obviously did have an impact on Kadafi and obviously the Bosnians believe, and I think the world believes that when a credible threat was made, at least for a short term, there was a change

in conduct by the Serbs.

Mr. SULLIVAN. If you intend to send a telegram that says we are going to behave differently than we have in the past, we have woken up, you have disturbed our slumber, yes, you can do that with air power and to the extent that these gentlemen feel that it would have an extraordinary impact on the morale of the victims, if nothing else, and cause some hesitation on the part of the aggressors, I have no objection to it.

You simply mustn't get in the frame of mind to be surprised if,

in fact, the artillery is not destroyed.

Moving on to these larger issues, would I expand the target set, of course. I cannot imagine solving this problem without the extension of confidence-destroying measures to all of those in the chain of command. I mean, look at the Escobar situation. We finally used American technology in conjunction with local police forces and we, in military terms, decapitated that problem. You have to do that.

But isn't there something terribly odd about this business of having a force, of policeman or relief workers over there that cannot

draw a gun in self-defense?

Co-Chairman HOYER. I think it's absurd.

Mr. SULLIVAN. How can that possibly be? And if, in fact, that is the kind of management diktat or operational diktat, we are going to get from the United Nations, it should be removed from that role. Leave it in the role of deciding what is a crime and what isn't a crime, be the legislators, not the executives-it's as bad as you tinkering with acquisition in the Defense Department, if I may say so. You are not experts, you ought to stay out.

Co-Chairman HOYER. You're getting personal now.

[Laughter.]

Mr. SULLIVAN. But it's the same thing. Let them do what they do best. Let them be the paragons of what is right and what is wrong. Where are the pales within which civilization will live?

Then take other organizations such as the one you represent here, like CSCE, and give them the responsibility for opening up the precinct to take care of the implementation of that law and order and keep that away from organizations that have no expertise and probably have biases in the wrong direction.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan, and thank all

three of you for being with us and giving us testimony.

Obviously, there's a lot of coverage of this apparently. I don't know who it's going out to or how much of it will go out, but it is a continuing educational effort on the part of this Commission and ultimately we have to decide as a society, as a western civilized group, and importantly as a group that now represents, essentially,

a world-wide consensus at what point will we intervene

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that earlier, a world-wide consensus on international borders, on the use of force, on standards of treatment of individuals and we're going to have to decide in this new world order how we implement those knowing full well in our own domestic societies it requires, Mr. Secretary, as you point out, police forces; police forces who take risks, who put themselves between the perpetrators of violence and crime and the victims and ultimately take those folks off the scene and keep them off the scene.

We're in a new world that is not bipolar. It's much more complicated, but we have, in my opinion, the technological and physical means to effect a more peaceful, a more humanitarian world, but we need the will to do so and the consensus to do so and hopefully

we'll all continue to work towards that end.

Again, thank you very much for being with us. The hearing is

adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Statement of Dennis DeConcini, Chairman Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing on Bosnia's Second Winter Under Siege Tuesday, February 8, 1994

I would like to welcome everyone to this latest Commission hearing on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and, more specifically, on the aggression and genocide which continues unabated. As we have seen from Saturday's massive attack by Serb gunners on the Sarajevo market, the first two months of 1994 have been among the worst for the residents of that former Olympic city in what is now almost two years of war.

After two years of genocide and starvation and despite the best efforts at appeasement by Western Europe and the United States, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina won't go away. It won't go away because, despite overwhelming odds, the victims have refused to surrender to the forces of genocide and territorial aggression. Given the fact that the West has severely crippled their struggle by refusing to lift the arms embargo which prevents them from obtaining even defensive weapons, the Bosnian government's valiant efforts are even more incredible.

One year ago tomorrow, the Clinton Administration gave us hope that resolute action would be taken to aid the Bosnian Government. But the Administration has chosen instead to hide behind Europeans opposing anything more than providing humanitarian aid to soothe their public's consciences, and negotiating with the aggressors responsible for orchestrating war crimes. We have seen a cowardly refusal to call this genocide. During this period, we have seen blame wrongly placed on Germany or other countries for provoking a war from outside. We have seen explanations of why a "siege" is not a "strangulation." We have seen statements that increasingly and wrongfully allege that all three sides were somehow responsible for the war and that nothing could or should be done to stop them from killing each other. To quote President Clinton last month: "I don't think that the international community has the capacity to stop people within that nation from their civil war until they decide to do it... They're going to have to make up their own mind to quit killing each other."

This U.S. policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina fails to understand the need for, and abilities of, U.S. leadership in the world. It fails to note long-term U.S interests in Europe which this conflict inevitably will affect, directly and indirectly. It fails to define objectives in a reasonable way that would allow the most effective and limited actions -- air strikes and, potentially, a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina -- to be forcefully advocated, adopted and implemented. It has failed to build a consensus for action based on the warranted moral outrage over what is being done to innocent human beings. U.S. policy to date, as part of the international community's response as a whole, has failed, and the only question is the extent to which this outcome is by accident or design.

Over the weekend, Lord Owen said the Bosnians have a way out of the continued genocide against them; they can simply accept a negotiated settlement, which rewards the Serb aggressors and relegates the Bosnians to a patchwork of isolated areas which comprise an absolutely unviable state over the long term. In 1992, Secretary of State Christopher said that "the world's response to the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War era." Apparently the leaders of the world's most powerful nations, including the world's only superpower, the United States, have decided that not only will territorial aggression rule the day, genocide will indeed be forgotten.

Turning to Croatia, it, too, was a victim of the war but is now siding with the aggressor in the hope of its own land grab. Many are calling for sanctions on Croatia. Croatia deserves sanctions, but I hope that this effort is not yet another sidetrack from the central cause of this horrendous conflict, the Serb militants -- those who deliberately target hospitals, schools, humanitarian aid lines, and busy market places.

With this said, the bottom line is that we need to act on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a comprehensive way, that looks at who is doing what and why.

Let me now welcome our two expert witnesses, who will speak in greater detail about the situation on the ground in Sarajevo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. First, we have Lionel Rosenblatt, President of Refugees International, a Washington-based organization which monitors and responds to refugee crises around the world. Refugees International regularly provides updates on the situation in Bosnia-herzegovina through its newsletter, Bosnia Winter Watch. Before joining Refugees International, Mr. Rosenblatt was a foreign service officer active in refugee affairs. He has travelled to Bosnia-Herzegovina many times in the past year, most recently in late January.

I would also like to welcome Mr. Kemal Kurspahic [KAY-mal kur-SPA-hitch], the didor in chief of the Sarajevo newspaper *Oslobodenje* [o-slow-bo-JEN-ee-ya]. The newspaper, which maintains a multi-ethnic staff, has continued to publish despite the siege of the city, the frequent absence of electricity and telephone lines, a shortage of paper, and the destruction of the newspaper's headquarters. Five journalists from the newspaper have been killed during the war,and Mr. Kurspahic [kur-SPA-hitch] himself was wounded by sniper fire. The newspaper has received international awards for its continued efforts to bring news to the besieged people of Sarajevo.

Statement of Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing on Bosnia's Second Winter Under Siege Tuesday, February 8, 1994

THE HEARING WE ARE HOLDING TODAY IS, UNFORTUNATELY, A VERY TIMELY ONE. ONE YEAR AGO, THE COMMISSION INITIATED A SERIES OF HEARINGS ON THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA DURING WHICH WITNESS AFTER WITNESS, REPRESENTATIVE AFTER REPRESENTATIVE, SENATOR AFTER SENATOR, SAID, IN EFFECT, "ENOUGH IS ENOUGH... THIS IS AGGRESSION... THIS IS GENOCIDE... THIS HAS TO STOP OR BE STOPPED NOW." TODAY, SARAJEVO CONTINUES TO BE POUNDED BY THE ARTILLERY SHELLS FIRED BY SERB MILITANTS ENTRENCHED IN THE SURROUNDING HILLS. TUZLA AIRPORT, WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS SAID IT WANTS TO OPEN, HAS RECENTLY BEEN SHELLED BY SERB MILITANTS AS WELL.

THERE IS EVIDENCE OF STARVATION, HUMANITARIAN AID IS NOT GETTING IN, VICTIM HAS TURNED ON VICTIM, AND, STILL, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BASICALLY SITS AND WATCHES. YES, NEWS REPORTS ABOUND OF OFFICIALS EVERYWHERE -- LONDON, NEW YORK, WASHINGTON -- SCURRYING TO COME UP WITH A RESPONSE TO THIS LATEST INCIDENT.

BUT WHY DO SO MANY OF THOSE GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA QUESTION WHETHER THEY WILL REALLY ACT THIS TIME? THE ANSWER IS OBVIOUS -- WARNING AFTER WARNING HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY FECKLESS BACKTRACKING RATHER THAN DECISIVE ACTION.

BUT WHY DIDN'T WE TAKE ACTION EARLIER, SUCH AS IN AUGUST 1992 WHEN REVELATIONS OF THE SERB-RUN DETENTION CAMPS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA MADE "NEVER AGAIN" RING GRIMLY IN OUR EARS? THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS ONE, WILL EVADE ME FOREVER.

WHATEVER THE ANSWER TO THIS IS, AT LEAST ANOTHER 100,000 PEOPLE - PROBABLY MORE -- HAVE DIED SINCE THEN, OF WHICH THE VICTIMS OF THE MARKET MASSACRE ARE ONLY AMONG THE MORE RECENT. SARAJEVO'S CITIZENS OF MANY ETHNIC PERSUASIONS, KNOWN EARLIER FOR THEIR COSMOPOLITAN AND GENUINELY EUROPEAN CHARACTER, RECENTLY HAVE BEEN COMMENTING THAT THEY FEEL THEY AND THEIR SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBERS ARE ONLY BEING KEPT ALIVE BY OUR HUMANITARIAN AID SO THAT THEY, TOO, WILL EVENTUALLY BE OBLITERATED BY THE EVENTUAL SERB SHELL. A RECENT REUTERS REPORT STATED THAT MANY CHILDREN IN SARAJEVO HAVE NOW DEVELOPED PASSIVE SUICIDAL TENDENCIES, NOT BOTHERING TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM GUNFIRE, ACCORDING TO U.N. OFFICIALS, BECAUSE THEY EXPECT TO DIE SOON ANYWAY.

- 2 -

THIS HEARING FOLLOWS ONE WHICH WAS HELD LAST OCTOBER ON THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, DURING WHICH WE SOUGHT TO FOCUS ON THE COMING WINTER IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. AT THAT TIME, WE CALLED FOR ACTION TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT A MAJOR CATASTROPHE FROM HAPPENING. NOW IT IS HAPPENING, AND THIS HEARING INTENDS TO LEARN THE SPECIFICS OF THE SITUATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE IN LIGHT OF THIS DISMAL FAILURE TO ACT.

THE ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEMS WE FACED THEN ARE THE SAME AS THOSE TO THE PROBLEMS WE FACE NOW. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I SUPPORT, FIRST AND FOREMOST, NATO AIR STRIKES AGAINST SERB POSITIONS AROUND SARAJEVO AND OTHER SO-CALLED "SAFE HAVENS." FROM THERE, WE CAN MOVE TO LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, PLACING SANCTIONS ON CROATIA, OR OTHER MEASURES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO A HALT. BUT THE SOONER WE STOP THE SERB MILITANTS WITH THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS AND THE SUPPLY LINES FROM BELGRADE, THE BETTER THE OUTCOME WILL BE ALL AROUND. IT IS ALREADY LATE FOR SUCH ACTION, BUT IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO SAVE LIVES THAT CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN DAILY.

IN THE LONGER TERM, I MUST ADD, WE MUST ALSO PROSECUTE THOSE WHO MAY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR WAR CRIMES, ON ALL SIDES AMONG THE ACTUAL COMBATANTS BUT CERTAINLY ALSO, AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL ON THE SERB SIDE, PEOPLE LIKE SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, RATKO MLADIC, RADOVAN KARADZIC AND OTHERS WHO FORMULATED THE POLICY OF GENOCIDE IN BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA AND ORCHESTRATED ITS IMPLEMENTATION. ONLY THIS WAY CAN THERE BEGIN WHAT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE A DIFFICULT PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND OF ALL THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, PEOPLE WHO ARE DESTINED TO LIVE NEXT TO EACH OTHER.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM THE WITNESSES TODAY REGARDING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND THEIR THOUGHTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR BOSNIA'S FUTURE. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE ONE FACT, HOWEVER, BEFORE CONCLUDING MY REMARKS. TEN YEARS AGO TO THE DAY, THE SARAJEVO WINTER OLYMPICS OPENED WITH MUCH FANFARE AND EXCITEMENT OVER THE COMING ATHLETIC COMPETITION. THE STADIUM WHERE THE OLYMPIC FLAME THEN BURST BRIGHTLY ONTO OUR TELEVISION SCREENS IS NOW A CEMETARY, THE RESTING PLACE OF SOME OF THE 10,000 SARAJEVANS KILLED SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIGHTING IN AND AROUND THE BOSNIAN CAPITAL. WHEN THE OLYMPIC FLAME, A SYMBOL OF CONTINUITY, IS IGNITED THIS SATURDAY IN LILLEHAMMER, ITS GLOW WILL BE MOST CERTAINLY DIMMED BY THE HARSH REALITY SURROUNDING THE STRANGULATION OF SARAJEVO AND THE AGGRESSION AND GENOCIDE WAGED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA.

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN EDWARD J. MARKEY (D-MA) COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE HEARING ON BOSNIA'S SECOND WINTER UNDER SIEGE 8 FEBRUARY 1994

Thank you Chairman DeConcini and Co-Chairman Hoyer for holding this hearing on the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina during their second winter under siege, and thank you Mr. Rosenblatt and Mr. Kurspahic for joining us today.

I find it outrageous and, frankly, totally unacceptable that the Bosnian people are today even worse off than they were when the Commission last met to discuss their plight. Back in October, we spoke about the gap between what needs to be done and what the international community is willing to do to end the bloodbath in the former Yugoslavia. As more Serb and Croat forces pour into Bosnia, and the war escalates while the international community remains immobile, this gap has widened into a giant chasm which threatens to swallow up the credibility of the United States and the European Community as leaders of a world community which has, in my opinion, a moral responsibility to act in the face of such brazen aggression.

And yet while the international community stays on the sidelines, Sarajevans like Mr. Kurspahic work courageously to preserve any trace of normalcy in what is the most horribly abnormal of circumstances. Despite the fact that five of his newspaper's journalists have been killed during the war, and despite the fact that he himself has been wounded by sniper fire, Mr. Kurspahic has continued to publish his newspaper, which included in yesterday's edition the names of 68 Bosnians killed over the weekend as they gathered at Sarajevo's open-air marketplace. I want you to know, Mr. Kurpahic, that you have our deep respect and admiration. I understand, however, that what you really need is not our sentiments but the full support of the United States and European governments.

After 22 months of bitter siege, Sarajevo's residents have been deprived of all civil, personal and social rights. Indeed, they have been deprived of the right to live. Everything that makes for regular urban living has been taken away from Sarajevo and its citizens; everything that could be taken away has already been taken away, all except the unshakable strength of their spirit. Despite tremendous hardship, residents push ahead, organize art exhibits, write poetry, design works of art, and perform concerts even as shells pound their city and tear apart the lives they have built for themselves. They somehow survive.

Will the world community answer the call or will we watch and wait as Bosnia is left to twist slowly in the wind, alone? A firm response by the international community is long passed due.

Once again, I commend the chairmen for scheduling this hearing and look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.

OPENING STATEMENT THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

HEARING: BOSNIA'S SECOND WINTER UNDER SIEGE February 8, 1994

Mr. Chairman, today we are again reminded of the painful saga of death and human suffering, the cry of the refugees and those stranded in the besieged areas of Bosnia. Sadly, it seems the United States has ignored the desperate calls for international leadership and the crisis continues to escalate. The nations of the world have failed to provide any hope for the suffering millions whose lives are threatened each day that this war continues.

As of last night, it appears that President Clinton has given his support to the United Nations plan that NATO be authorized to initiate air strikes against Serbian positions around Sarajevo. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this is not just another bluff which could send a mixed signal to the aggressive Serbs. Otherwise, it is yet another cruel joke on the people of Bosnia... the citizens of Sarajevo.

The Bosnian people deserve honesty, definitive action, military air strikes for protection, political resolve and unwavering leadership. I only hope this latest announcement is not too little too late.

After 22 months of fighting and killing, each day that world leaders fail to respond to this crisis more people suffer and die, and an end to the tragedy becomes more difficult to achieve.

Mr. Chairman, I herald the heroic efforts of our witnesses, especially Lionel Rosenblatt and Kemal Kurspahic, who put their lives on the line to bring relief to the millions of refugees whose lives have been uprooted, and to diligently report the news to a beleaguered Sarajevo.



TESTIMONY OF
LIONEL A. ROSENBLATT
PRESIDENT
Refugees International

before the

U.S. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

FEBRUARY 8, 1994

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Rosenblatt Testimony before the Helsinki Commission - Page 1/6.

Mr. Chairman, your hearing today comes at a crucial time in the continuing humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia.

There has been no dearth of media coverage of the suffering in Bosnia. The risk is that we will inure ourselves to the problem and ignore the profound difference that vigorous U.S. leadership could make even at this late stage.

As I was drafting these words three days ago, the first news of the Saturday market massacre in Sarajevo came in over the radio: one shell lands among the market crowds, killing 45 and wounding scores more, many seriously, so the death toll is sure to grow. As of yesterday, the death toll had grown to 68 dead and almost 200 wounded, the worst atrocity inflicted on the people of Sarajevo since the Bosnian Serbs put the city under siege 22 months ago. NATO observation aircraft flew uselessly overhead.

This vile attack underscores several truths:

- Sarajevo IS under murderous siege. Thousands of civilians have been killed and tens of thousands wounded in that city alone.
- Bombardment of civilians is a war crime and must be stopped.
- The means to take out the artillery hammering Sarajevo exist in the NATO air strike force already mobilized. The Security Council has called for use of air power to suppress bombardment of safe havens, including Sarajevo and President Clinton has recently reiterated that air power should be used if the city is being strangled.
- This horrible attack represents murderous strangulation and is a last call to action.

Rosenblatt Testimony before the Helsinki Commission - Page 2/6.

Two weeks ago in the Bosnian capital six children died on their sleds; several days ago nine people were killed while standing in a food relief line. Each time, many people around the world said "enough."

We are not calling for ground troops or strategic bombing, but to protect civilians from further attack with air power. Air power is not perfect, but FURTHER INACTION IS NO LONGER AN ACCEPTABLE OPTION.

PRESIDENT CLINTON, UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE LINE IS NOT DRAWN HERE, IF THERE IS NO REPLY TO THIS MURDEROUS SHELLING, THE BOSNIAN SERBS WILL CORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY CAN INFLICT ANY IMAGINABLE ATROCITY ON CIVILIANS IN BOSNIA WITHOUT COST. WE MAY AS WELL HAND OVER SARAJEVO TO ITS BESIEGERS.

When air strikes have looked likely, the Serbs have reduced shelling; when, as occurred last July, Secretary Christopher says that there is nothing more that can be done, the shelling intensifies.

The war in Bosnia has come to the point where the chief remedies lie in the credible threat of force to protect civilians and deliver humanitarian assistance. Let me briefly outline the humanitarian situation and recommend several immediate actions:

The scope of the suffering in Bosnia is staggering: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that of the 4.3 million persons at risk in the former Yugoslavia, 2.7 million (over 60 percent) are civilians in Bosnia.

In the face of this need, the UNHCR is able to deliver less than half the minimum food requirement. In Central Bosnia, which includes Zenica and Tuzla, the most populous region of the country, only about 20 percent of the needs are being met.

Rosenblatt Testimony before the Helsinki Commission - Page 3/6.

Both Serbian and Croatian forces are blocking vitally needed UN relief shipments. The continuing refusal of Croatia to expedite shipment of humanitarian aid from the Dalmatian coast into Bosnia is another form of acute strangulation. The Serbs, in addition to blocking many land routes, have refused to agree to open Tuzla airport and have begun to shell the airfield.

Some of the most acute shortages are in Maglaj and Tesanj, where UNHCR food convoys have been blocked for more than three months, and where there are reports of near-starvation. According to a recent UNHCR report:

In the besieged enclave of Maglaj, some 16,000 people are living in appalling conditions. In seven months of siege, only one UNHCR convoy has managed to reach the town, which is almost entirely dependent on air drops organized by UNHCR, the United States, Germany and France. Two UNHCR field officers who spent five days... in an unsuccessful effort to get a convoy into Maglaj reported that a "significant percentage" (20 to 30 percent) of the population is "severely malnourished.... Cupboards are literally bare and several children seen by us are only skin and bones. The population is demoralized, malnourished and terrorized by continued (Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat) shelling. The health situation is critical."

Ten days ago, when I met with the Prime Minister of Bosnia, he urged that air drops of food to these areas be accelerated. The Mostar area is also suffering acutely, especially the east bank which is under blockade and bombardment by Croatian forces; the civilian population is forced to huddle underground in the basement rubble of blown out buildings.

There is the recent additional problem of military units from Croatia and Serbia invading Bosnia.

Rosenblatt Testimony before the Helsinki Commission - Page 4/6.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Protect civilians from continuing bombardment with a credible threat of air strikes, starting with the artillery ringing Sarajevo. THE SERBIAN GUNNERS SHOULD BE GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM TO WITHDRAW WITHIN 48 HOURS. Other areas should be included, including Mostar, where the Croatian forces should end their bombardment.
- As the international community is not prepared to defend against new attacks on the civilian population with ground troops, the Bosnians should no longer be barred from the means to defend themselves. THE ARMS EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED.

3. DELIVER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY:

- Open up land routes and Tuzla airport using air power if necessary.
- Open routes from the Dalmatian coast into central Bosnia, INVOKING SANCTIONS AGAINST CROATIA IF ROUTES ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY OPENED.

These recommendations are limited and feasible, not requiring additional UN ground troops. The missing ingredient is the political will of the international community. The U.S., which could galvanize a stronger approach, assiduously looks the other way; top officials wring their hands and rationalize inaction.

One of the latest twists from senior State Department officials is that action on Bosnia is not worth the risk to the Clinton presidency. One wonders if Chamberlain got similar advice on the way to Munich. Contrary to the counsel from his advisors, failure to act now will haunt the President for the rest of his term and tarnish his place in history.

Rosenblatt Testimony before the Helsinki Commission - Page 5/6.

I have frequently visited Sarajevo over the past 14 months. The continuing spirit of its people under fire -- and until now abandoned by the world -- defies understanding or adequate words of praise.

A series of UN generals have come to Sarajevo. They usually arrive with the view that all parties in this war are equally to blame. They leave with a different view. When he quit his Sarajevo command last month in deep frustration, General Francis Briquemont saluted the city:

It is difficult for me to leave Sarajevo. This city is for me the reflection of a Europe I love: multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual.

Your city, much like Brussels where I live, is a city of cross-roads. If Europe loses these cross-roads, it will become substantially impoverished. I don't know if what I say is clear to you, but you can't imagine how much I admire you all, Muslim, Serbian or Croat. I admire you for your dignity during these trying times, for your fierce spirit of resistance and for your strong resolution in refusing to let die the spirit of Sarajevo.

I don't know if you will succeed in your goals. The whole of Europe is stricken these days with a narrow nationalism that is more and more directed against the values of the 'other', instead of being based on the peaceful expression of its own culture, although Europe has a tremendous richness of cultures. And I hope that Sarajevo will stay what it is, irrespective of the structure this country will have in the future: a cultural fortress of Europe.

Ten years ago this week, the Winter Olympics opened in Sarajevo. The spirit of the city today, under fire, is the highest epitome of the Olympic spirit. But without protection, the Olympic flame in Sarajevo will be snuffed out. We are at a turning point.

Rosenblatt Testimony before the Helsinki Commission - Page 6/6.

President Clinton, sending medical teams to help those wounded three days ago in Sarajevo is an important gesture, but the only adequate way to give meaning to the men, women and children killed in the market is to take action to defend civilians in Bosnia from further attack.

President Clinton, for their sake and for U.S. credibility, take the courage to lead. The U.S. cannot dodge this shell.

B:CSCECOM.1

IHE_CONTINUING_BOSNIAN_CRISIS CAN_WE_DQ_SOMETHING?

Testimony before the US CSCE Commission

February 8, 1994

by Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Congressman McCloskey for your generous introduction. I cannot say it is a pleasure to be here in this time of international embarrassment and disgrace. However, I am receiving my just deserts because I have been writing on this subject from a position of no authority, no responsibility, and absolutely no insider knowledge.

Let me say what I am \underline{not} . I was not a career military man. I was not a career bureaucrat or a cabinet officer. I was never CEO of a large business. civil- or defense-oriented. I am not an academic, but an engineer and analyst by training. I have not sought and do not claim any support for my views.

I am a US citizen by birth, and believe I am also a concerned citizen of the world I live in. I am semi-retired from the national security consulting business, and I benefit from Social Security and Medicare. I have been privileged to serve in uniform in WWII, in industry during a major mobilization (korea) and the hi-tech arms race (Cold War), as a government technologist in an unwinnable "low intensity war" (Vietnam), and in hi-tech arms transfers (Israeli war 1973). I have participated in all aspects of the acquisition game from designing and selling in industry to initiating, expediting, approving, buying and cancelling in the government.

I have participated in analysing the acquisition system, operational support costs, hypothetical wars (NATO), and real (?) wars (drugs and DESERT

STORM). I have supported negotiations and verification efforts. I have also developed DoD budgets and five year plans and written defense guidance. I know full well the multiple linkages between defense spending and both current and future defense operational capabilities. [I was involved in one way or another with almost every (non-stealth) weapon used in the Gulf War.]

I consider myself something of a <u>futurist</u> and something of an <u>iconoclast</u>. I write about things that are on my mind, and sometimes they get published. I believe we are face to face with our future and we had best stop blinking. It is time to make major changes in our military and security thinking. I hope our institutions are up to the task. My recent paper about these new world demands has brought me to your attention. Let me summarize my views:

Post cold war disorders more closely resemble <u>crimes</u> than <u>wars</u>, and seldom pit government against government in high-intensity combat. The crimes are generally gross violations of the growing body of international law, but <u>not wars that can be won</u> in the military sense. They must be countered by a combination of military, paramilitary, and civil agencies applying a variety of political economic, and physical sanctions. The question is whether such global laws and conventions will be enforced by global, regional, or national authorities. Neither global responses by the UN nor unilateral responses by individual nations (including the US) are appropriate. The best alternative is to evolve <u>regional security apparatuses (RSA)</u> capable of maintaining law and order within "acceptable" levels of (inevitable) violence, using a new combination of <u>"high-tech" civil and military resources</u> specifically tailored to deal with these categorically different circumstances.

The development of versatile RSAs for Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Asia/Pacific region, present some fascinating alternatives to the now obsolete functions of NATO--and the unilateral roles and commands

currently peculiar to US forces. The US would do well to encourage the formation and implementation of regional security apparatuses and to apply some of its now surplus technological creativity to augmenting their inspection, law enforcement, and paramilitary capabilities and to enhancing their effectioness. The gradual transformation of both NATO and the US Southern and Facific Commands into RSAs would make excellent test cases.

Let me dwell for a minute on the differences between warfighting and crimefighting because they are central to this Boshian tragedy. Wars are fought between nations or block of nations. Crimes are fought by smaller groups against other groups. Wars are deterred, or fought and decided. Crimes are perpetual, and only the level of their violence can be controlled. Wars are fought in the countryside: crime in the cities. Warfighters are legitimately empowered to hate their enemy and defile their way of life. Crime fighters are struggling against somebody a citizens, often with equal "rights" Warfighters focus on destroving "targets"; crime fighters focus on bringing the guilty to justice through indictment. Warfighters accept substantial collateral damage: crimefighters must respect the innocent bystanders. And Mr. Chairman, most parfighters and crimefighters honor strict codes of conduct. While hardened criminals break all the laws.of.civilized.human.behavior.

Based on these foregoing platitudes, let me address what I think the civilized world—and certainly all civilized Europeans—must do about the Bosnian tragedy (recognizing that this is an open forum, and thousands of lives are at stake). Here are twenty items for your consideration:

- Treat the problem as a <u>crime wave</u> run amok in the absence of any disciplinary resistance;
- 2) Recognize that it is not a war to be won, but a crime wave to be suppress ed to "acceptable" levels:

- 3) Recognize that <u>all civilized nations have a stake in global law and order</u>; this has nothing to do with the cold war "vital interests" of a single nation, but with the moral fiber of civilization;
- 4) Declare that large caliber conventional stand-off weapons (artillery, rockets, and mortars) are as surely weapons of mass destruction as nuclear and chemical missiles: they just make the target people suffer longer:
- 5) Recognize that these remotely fired, stand-off weapons make every would-be criminal brave enough to participate in the mayhem, thereby swelling the ranks of the dedicated cealots with hordes of weekend cowards:
- Take necessary steps to <u>level the crimefield</u>; give the defenders the right to bear arms, and oblige the criminals to abandon their weapons of mass destruction, by force if necessary;
- 7) Organize a <u>regional apparatus</u> for crime-fighting. This is not somebody else's problem, nor is it the unique problem of self-proclaimed sole-remaining superpower. This is fundamental to CSCE's future role;
- 8) Engage the victims fully in their own salvation; crime prevention cannot be waged over the heads and hearts of the potential victims;
- 9) Do not let the (global) legislative branch (UN, etc.) try to manage the (regional) executive branch actions. Let the UN set global standards and laws: develop regional "precincts" to enforce them independently;
- 10) Managing a crime reduction program is just as demanding of thoroughly professional skills as eye surgery. <u>Don't let BBG become the next LBJ</u>.
- 11) Do not initiate a <u>retaliatory strike</u> out of anger: ask the Israelis how well that works. As a notable once said, don't get angry, get even;
- 12) It is essential that the "battlefield" be thoroughly understood and, to the extent possible, <u>prepared for subsequent activities</u>. Crimefighting demands a depth of cultural understanding not required in warfighting;

- Do not assume that crime-reduction is the natural domain of the military or of the NATO we used to know and love. Many of these missions are best conducted by special forces, paramilitary specialists, and trained operatives of other law enforcement agencies:
- 14) Establish a crime-reduction program of <u>substantial duration</u>: it is naive to claim we're going to either clean up Somali, Bosnia, Haiti--or North-east Washington--within a few months, or take our marbles and go home:
- Accept the obvious fact that those who serve the causes of justice may be asked to give their lives for their service. It is ludicrous to consider pulling out of some crime area if we take <u>casualties</u>—unless of course we offer the same freedom to police, firefighters, federal law enforcers, missionaries, lifeguards, and school crossing guards:
- 16) Embrace the importance of political and economic sanctions as valuable tools of the trade, and extend economic discomfort across the full spectrum of the perpetrators'—and accomplices'—civil infrastructure;
- 17) Exploit opportunities to exercise "confidence destroying measures" by which to encourage the criminal to rethink his plans and objectives.

 International agencies should be no more reluctant to authorize "dirty tricks" and "covert operations" than their civil LEA counterparts.
- 18) Make sure that the crimefighters have the best possible intelligence

 and surveillance equipment. There should be absolutely no ambiguity

 as to where weapons of mass destruction are firing from, or where resup
 plies are coming from. The US must not hold back here:
- 19) The use of force is a necessary—but not sufficient—element in crime—
 fighting, particularly in its advanced stages. It is essential to strike
 back <u>selectively</u> and <u>effectively</u>. Disabling, capture, and neutralization
 of "targets" is preferrable—and eases subsequent rehabilitation;

20) Last but not least, recognize that <u>modern technology</u> can be very useful in many facets of crime-reduction, crime solving—and victim self-defense, not only in Bosnia, but probably right here in Washington, too.

Thank you, I will try to respond to questions or statements as desired.

(Mr. Sullivan is a Washington-based national security consultant. He was principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 1972-73, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) 1973-76. He joined the Defense Department in 1964 from the Grumman Corporation.)

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Statement by U.S. Rep. Frank R. Wolf

Congressional Delegation to the Balkans January 4 - 10, 1994

This report provides a short narrative and findings of the Wolf delegation to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to meet with leaders and representatives of the belligerent factions, to visit with a US military "MASH" medical unit, and to travel with an armored relief convoy to Mostar on the front lines of the pitched battle between the Muslim and Croatian fighters and see, first hand, the deplorable and inhumane conditions that exist in this city under siege.

I recently returned from an official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina which, all across the land, is being ripped apart by fighting among Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims and by Serbia and Croatia as well. My intention to again visit Sarajevo, having previously been there in September 1992, was blocked by intense Serb shelling of the city before, during and after my trip. The continuing bombardment which included daily pounding of the airport and its runway caused all relief, humanitarian and re-supply flights into Sarajevo to be cancelled. At one point, I was airborne in a Russian cargo aircraft half-way to Sarajevo from Zagreb, Croatia, loaded with gear and personnel needed by the UN, when shelling of the airport resumed and our flight and others also headed there were diverted back to base.

I was able to travel, on January 7, to the Bosnian town of Mostar with a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) convoy escorted by elements of the Spanish Battalion of UN troops. Perhaps conditions are even worse in Mostar than in Sarajevo. This town is the front line of the Muslim push to the Adriatic Sea. Divided by the Neretva River, whose course runs from Central Bosnia to the Adriatic on the Dalmatian coast of Croatia, east Mostar is held by the Muslims. They are sandwiched between the Bosnian Croats -holding west Mostar and its high ground, particularly the prominent Mount Hum from which Croat snipers, mortars and artillery have a straight shot onto the buildings, streets and throughways of the eastern half of town -- and Serb gunners entrenched in the steep mountains ringing Mostar farther to the east.

Our jumping-off point for Mostar was the city of Split on the coastline of the Adriatic Sea. Located on the southern crescent of Croatia, a short distance

from the off-shore island of Brac, from which the pure white marble in the White House was quarried, Split is a bustling seaport with a good network of roads and a first class airport. Mountains of UN relief supplies could be seen stockpiled around the city. A two-hour drive eastward into the Bosnian town of Medjugorje allowed us to join up with the UN convoys, transfer into armored personnel carriers and don bulletproof jackets and helmets before heading north to Mostar.

Medjugorje is at the base of a mountain where visions of the Virgin Mary were revealed to local children during the past decade and to which a steady flow of religious pilgrimages from around the globe now visit.

Our transit to Mostar was one of two convoys that day. We were joined by another procession of escorted trucks bringing in all too little lifegiving food, meager medical supplies and none of the critically needed diesel oil which is in continual demand — not so much to ease the winter's chill, as to provide only crucial electrical power to the hospital and for other emergency services. The staggering shortage of this life-saving fuel oil was driven home later in a Mostar hospital operating room where we saw a river-water-filled tin can bubbling over a wood fire functioning as the sole means of sterilizing surgical instruments used and reused in an assembly line-like procession of operations on shelling and sniper victims.

Our armored convoy under the direction of former British General Jerry Hume, now working with UNHCR and a true angel of mercy to these beleaguered people, left Medjugorje and crossed the Neretva River well south of Mostar and wound its way by the back door under the then thankfully silent Serbian guns into east Mostar. Dropping our Spanish Battalion escort at center city, we proceeded to what now passes as City Hall for brief meetings with the War Presidency, a five-person executive body trying to cope with governing and providing services to this city under siege. We were given one grim statistic after another punctuated by the sound of shelling and sniper fire taking place just outside the boarded up window. Fifty shells in downtown yesterday. Three dead, 38 wounded. One thousand surgeries since fighting began on May 9, 1993, many by candlelight. No oxygen. No electrical power. No heating. No ambulances. On and on. The only positive note, because of a mild winter (so far), things are not ten times worse.

A walking tour of east Mostar, or what is left of it, followed. Most buildings are reduced to empty shells reminiscent of World War II bombed out cities. Much of life has moved underground in unlighted, unheated and certainly unventilated cellars. Young children, women and the elderly climb out of these dens only too infrequently when the shelling pauses. Even the persistent cloud covered gloom offers a too bright contrast to the nearly pitch black basements so

that people do little more than stand around. Blinking. Bewildered. Life does go on. We held for a moment, a seven-day old baby girl. People seemed eager just to touch us. To hear us. To somehow sense that there is indeed a civilization beyond this living hell.

It was little better outside the cellars. Streets running toward the river offered clear fields of fire to snipers on the hill in west Mostar. Walkers trudge along the crossing streets until, arriving at an intersection, they suddenly sprint across the opening, their haste denying a sniper the time to draw a bead. We, too, quickly mastered this tactic. At some intersections people had stacked tires, wood and metal sheets and other debris to obscure the sniper's vision of ongoing foot traffic. The ceaseless and constant reverberation of shots fired quickly fade into the background as people, seemingly, were incapable of assimilating any more horror.

Next stop, the hospital. Or what passes for a hospital — a three or four story former laboratory looking out over the river and west Mostar. The red building facing resembled something from a World War II movie, pockmarked by sniper fire with gaping holes caused by, we were told, direct hits from tank cannons. The Red Cross flag flying in front was in tatters from bullet holes. In back, the last remaining ambulance was pushed out of the way, a victim of west Mostar target practice. Inside, we found conditions almost indescribably bad. A casualty, an old man, lay on the operating table, as two green clad medics dug shrapnel from a gaping neck wound without benefit of anesthesia. In the intensive care unit, horribly marred victims huddled on cots. We were told that all but a very few of the most critical patients in this 40-bed hospital were sent home a day or two before to make room for the victims of this latest round of shelling. They, too, could expect an all too brief stay to make room for more still to come.

We soon departed this town of the living dead, retracing our route, pausing briefly while Spanish escort troops cleared a fallen tree from the roadway. Rigged with wires and cables to resemble a booby-trap, the debris was ever so gingerly pulled from our path by a cautious soldier, a reminder that the games played in Mostar often have a far deadlier ending. Arriving back in Medjugorje, we quickly departed for the town of Grude to meet with Mr. Mate Boban, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats. Clearly, his view of what is taking place there differs from my own. I urged him to end the siege of Mostar, the existence of which he denies.

Having completed this, my third trip to the former Yugoslavia, I have, with sadness, concluded that conditions there have grown worse with the passage of time. It is hard to believe that this has happened and been allowed to continue in a civilized world. There are several things that our government ought to do.

We should focus more attention on this spot. I do not believe a high level member of the Clinton administration has even visited Sarajevo or Belgrade or, until US Permanent Representative to the UN Albright's just concluded trip, even to Zagreb. I hope our government will now make this a top priority matter and appoint a high level representative — someone of the stature of retired Admiral Crowe, General Vernon Walters or perhaps former Secretary of State Schultz — whose job will be literally to aggressively and solely pursue this issue, criss-crossing the country, meeting with all the leaders, bringing them to the table to hammer out solutions. This really hasn't been done by the United States.

The first order of business is to resolve the confrontation between the Croats and Muslims. They simply should not be fighting despite the terrible things they have done to each other. If they are unwilling to do this, perhaps we should impose sanctions on Croatia. The Croatian Bosnian Army (HVO) is shelling east Mostar and there is no justification for this. Also, most independent observers would agree that the Bosnian Muslim Army is aggressively on the move, retaking more and more land.

Congress, too, should involve itself more in this issue. The House and Senate should hold hearings on this conflict. This is an issue which ought to be discussed and debated before the American people.

I tend to be more sympathetic to the Croats and Muslims but there is blame enough for all. On a blame-scale of one to ten, I would assign the Serbs a nine, the Croats a five and the Muslims a two. All sides commit atrocities. All sides engage in ethnic cleansing. This horror will likely continue as long as the world tolerates it. If, after all other possibilities have been exhausted, and the warring sides still cannot find common ground, stronger coercive action must be considered, perhaps air strikes.

At a time when the newly opened Holocaust Museum in our nation's capital attracts millions trying to understand how this tragedy of World War II could have happened, how can we sit idly by and watch this new horror go on.

Years ago, there was a woman in New York City named Kitty Genovese who was brutally attacked on the street. Many people heard her screams but no one came to her aid or even called the police. She died as a result of the attack. What is taking place in Bosnia is an international Kitty Genovese case and the nations of the world are listening to the screams and doing little to help. We and other free nations must now engage and somehow bring this terrorism to a halt.









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